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Abstract 
 
 
 
 In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that, in constructing the basic structure of a 
just society, any social and economic inequalities must be part of a scheme of cooperation that 
works to the benefit of the least advantaged social class. He calls this principle of distributive 
justice the difference principle. In A Law of Peoples, however, he backs away from this claim, 
arguing for weaker cosmopolitan duties in constructing an international social order. This thesis 
does two things. 1.) It explores this tension in Rawls’s work, arguing that in order for the Law of 
Peoples to be consistent with A Theory of Justice, Rawls must embrace a global difference 
principle. 2.) It then investigates the implications of this conclusion, arguing that a global 
difference principle would necessitate robust duties of cosmopolitan aid, but would necessitate 
neither a world government nor open borders. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 Social contract theory has, historically, looked inward, asking how governments and 
societies ought be structured.  As the world becomes ever more interconnected, questions of 
justice increasingly arise on the international, rather than national, level.  These questions of 
global justice have received philosophical consideration from a variety of schools of thought, 
including Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism.  One of the primary 
accounts of global justice is that offered by John Rawls.  However, Rawls’s theory of 
international justice stands in stark contrast with his approach to domestic justice.  In the former 
case, he advocates minimal principles of justice, whereas in the latter he promotes broad 
egalitarian principles.  My project here explores this tension.  Moreover, I argue that given the 
existence and scope of the global basic structure, a Rawlsian account of global justice would 
converge with a cosmopolitan account and yield principles of strong economic and social 
welfare rights.   
 This question is important on both philosophical and empirical levels.  Theoretically, I 
seek to align one of the primary approaches to political theory of international relations with 
empirical realities of the world.  Moreover, questions of international justice affect the lives and 
livelihoods of billions of people around the world.  Creating a consistent and valuable theoretical 
framework for understanding moral obligations in the international sphere is imperative to 
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bringing justice to individuals and states across the globe. John Rawls’s theory of justice 
provides one potential source for understanding global justice. 
However, Rawls’s conception of justice is strikingly different at the domestic level than it 
is in the international sphere. Unpacking the differences between his two approaches requires 
discussion of several key terms—justice, the difference principle, and the global basic structure.  
Understanding these terms is essential to my later discussion of the application of Rawls’s 
domestic conception of justice to the international sphere. How applicable these principles are to 
the global order, I argue, depends on the nature global basic structure. In order to frame and 
situate justice in the international context, thus, I first define distributive justice, the difference 
principle, and global basic structure.  
 
Rawlsian Justice and the Difference Principle 
 John Rawls writes that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions…laws and 
institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are 
unjust.”1 An evaluation of global structures or orders must, therefore, begin and end with an 
account of justice in a Rawlsian scheme.  Rawls’s conception of justice is one of fairness.  As 
Freeman explains, justice as fairness is  
The name Rawls gives to his conception of justice…The name derives from the 
idea that fair principles of justice should result from a fair initial choice situation 
that incorporates all the relevant moral and practical reasons—the fairness of the 
initial situation is presumed to transfer to the principles chosen therein.
2
  
 
In other words, justice as fairness is the idea that the principles of justice are those that 
reasonable people would choose behind a veil of ignorance, that is, without knowing their own 
unique social position, race, creed, or other distinguishing characteristics.  In the domestic case, 
                                                     
1
 Rawls, John.  1971.  A Theory of Justice.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 3. 
2
 Freeman, Samuel.  2007.  Rawls.  Oxon: Routledge: 473. 
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the principles of justice are “the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further 
their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental 
terms of their association.”3  This initial situation, or position, is the hypothetical original 
position.  In the original position, participants are behind a veil of ignorance and are thereby 
unaware of their particular identities: for example race, gender, or age.
4
  The principles of justice 
that guide Rawls’s theory derive from this position, and create two principles, at least in the 
domestic case.   
The first principle holds that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”5 In other 
words, if a society is just, it must ensure that every person within it has the greatest possible 
liberty possible without infringing on the liberty of others.  Second, “social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged…and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.”6  Crucially, the first part of the second principle creates what Rawls 
calls a difference principle.  The difference principle “requires that social and economic 
institutions be arranged so as to distribute income and wealth, and powers and positions of office 
so as to maximize the share that goes to the least advantaged members of society.”7 The 
difference principle thus provides a check on the institutions and basic structures of a society: 
any inequalities in the system must be to the advantage of the least well-off.   
The other aspect of Rawlsian justice is the idea of justice as reciprocity.  Justice requires 
reciprocity, which is “a general requirement that each person engaged in cooperation should not 
                                                     
3
 Rawls 1971 11 
4
 Ibid.  18 
5
 Ibid.  302 
6
 Ibid.  302 
7
 Freeman 467-468 
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simply benefit (mutual advantage), but should benefit on terms that are fair.”8 In other words, 
justice as reciprocity requires that the terms of the institutions be such that mutual benefit is not 
enough: the benefit must be on terms that are fair.  This account of justice as requiring 
reciprocity follows naturally from the idea of justice as fairness.  Brian Barry further argues that 
“justice as reciprocity [is] the idea that benefits should be required, equal value exchanged for 
equal value.”9 For example, if a farmer sells his crop to a merchant, and the merchant pays an 
unfairly low wage, the fact that both parties benefited (the farmer received money for his crops 
and the merchant received crops to sell) does not mean that the interaction was just, or allowable 
under a just system.  The exchange must create reciprocal advantage if it is to be fair, and thus 
just.   
Furthermore, Barry highlights the fundamentally institutional nature of this 
conception of justice.  He argues:  
Justice as reciprocity … already presupposes some more fundamental criterion of 
distribution.  Contracts presuppose prior property rights; fair exchange is morally 
significant only if the parties have a title to what they exchange…and we can talk 
about cooperation for mutual benefit only if we have some baseline for measuring 
benefits in the absence of cooperation.
10
  
 
Thus, justice as reciprocity, and hence justice as fairness, demand an institutional conception, 
rather than an interactional conception, meaning that they must be institutionalized and cannot 
rely exclusively on individual actions to create justice.
11
 Institutions must establish systems of 
justice in order for the criterion of reciprocity to be applicable.   
                                                     
8
 Ibid.  481 
9
 Barry, Brian.  1980.  “Do Countries Have Moral Obligations? The Case of World Poverty.” The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Rights.  Delivered at Harvard University: 29. 
10
 Ibid.  35 
11
 I borrow the terms institutional and interactional, and their meanings as such, from Pogge, Thomas.  
1992.  “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” Ethics.  Vol.  103 No.  1: 48-73. 
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 The Rawlsian framework of justice, then, is conceived as fairness that derives from the 
original position, wherein reasonable people under the veil of ignorance select principles of 
justice for a fair society.  Central to this account of justice as fairness is the idea of justice as 
reciprocity, that justice needs to be an equal exchange, or else it is unfair and thus unjust. 
 So far, this discussion of justice has been focused on Rawls’s conception of domestic 
justice, of the institutions and principles at play within the boundaries of a state.  Indeed, Rawls’s 
focus on justice primarily emphasizes the domestic sphere.  In The Law of Peoples, he seeks to 
extend his domestic conception of justice as fairness to the international realm.  In determining 
what justice in an international account would require and entail, he explicitly “duplicates” the 
features of a just domestic society.
12
 Thus, what Rawls sees as essential for justice in the 
domestic case—fairness, reciprocity—must also exist in the international case, if the 
international case is to be equally just. 
 Others have offered corollary definitions of global justice.  Thomas Pogge argues that “a 
plausible conception of global justice must be sensitive to international social and economic 
inequalities.”13 Thus, a valid conception of global justice must take into account the 
differentiated living situations of those who it most intimately affects.  Pogge furthers that “a 
liberal conception of justice is defined…as one that…demands that certain rights, liberties, and 
opportunities be secure for all citizens, gives this demand a high priority vis-à-vis other values 
and interests, and demands that all citizens should have adequate means to take advantage of 
their rights, freedoms, and opportunities.”14 
                                                     
12
 Rawls, John.  1999.  The Law of Peoples.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 18. 
13Pogge, Thomas.  1994.  “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples.” Philosophy and Public Affairs.  Vol.  23 (3): 
195-224: 196 
14
 Ibid.  207 
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 In approaching questions of global structures I accept Rawls’s claim that justice is the 
criterion by which a system may be evaluated.   In going forward, I take justice to be as Rawls 
articulates it and as other have expanded it.  Justice, then, ought be understood as the principles 
for organizing and structuring institutions that actors would choose in an original position 
wherein their knowledge about their lives and stakes are restricted.  The principles they would 
choose would be principles of fairness and reciprocity that ensure that all members of the 
contract have their rights maximized as far as is possible without limiting the rights of others, 
and that any inequalities are to the advantage of the least advantage, thus preserving the 
importance of reciprocity in Rawls’s idea of justice.  I apply this universal account of justice in 
my discussion of global justice.   
 
Global Basic Structure 
 The role of justice in the international realm cannot be understood without an 
understanding of the concept of a global basic structure.  The global basic structure, like the 
basic structure of a domestic society, is fundamentally the background conditions and institutions 
upon which society is built.  I begin with Rawls’s conception of the basic structure in a domestic 
society and its implications and then discuss arguments for the existence of an equivalent global 
order. 
Freeman defines the basic structure of society as, “The design of the basic social and 
political institutions that structure daily life and individuals’ decisions and actions, which 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages of social 
cooperation.” 15  In other words, the basic structure is the institutions that define and constrain our 
choices in a society.  The basic structure provides the ‘background justice’ necessary for a just 
                                                     
15
 Freeman 464 
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society.  Background justice is “the justice of laws and social and political institutions that 
provide background conditions and constraints upon people’s decisions and actions.”16 The basic 
structure thus must ensure this background justice.  Without these initial conditions for justice, 
no true justice can be achieved.  For instance, Rawls contends that contracts entered into without 
the just background conditions that a just basic structure creates are invalid.
17
 Put another way, 
the basic structure is “the ways in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the divisions of advantages from social cooperation.”18 Thus, for 
a system to be just, the basic structure must also be just. The converse, however, is also true: If 
there is no basic structure, then there can be no social system to be just or unjust.  Without a 
basic structure, there is no system of political and social institutions to be called just or unjust.  If 
there is to be any system at all, there must first be a basic structure. 
Rawls also specifies several requirements for an acceptable basic structure.  It “must 
include a family of representative bodies whose role in the hierarchy is to take part in an 
established procedure of consultation and to look after what the people's common good idea of 
justice regards as the important interests of all members of the people.”19 A basic structure, 
therefore, must consider the interests of every member of that society.  Thomas Pogge further 
clarifies this understanding, providing a definition of a ‘social institution’ which is central to the 
concept of a basic structure: “Social institutions are a species of social practices and thus are in 
some ways analogous to games and rituals…So the term institution is used here in a sense that—
allowing the … addition of 'social'—contrasts with its other sense of organization or corporation 
(as in 'institution of higher learning').  For this latter sense of institution, Rawls uses the term 
                                                     
16
 Ibid.  463-464 
17
 Rawls 1971 8 
18
 Ibid.  7 
19
 Rawls 1999 71. Emphasis added. 
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association."
20
  In other words, institutions as conceived in the basic structure are not only 
political or social structures that create rules, but also the practices and codes—formalized or 
not—that derive from them. 
Despite his rejection of the idea of distributive justice, even Nozick’s libertarianism has a 
conception of a basic structure.
21
  Nozick’s basic structure, unlike Rawls’s, "consists of certain 
prohibitions against force and fraud, certain rules of acquisition, transfer, and rectification of 
holdings, and some basic mechanisms of adjudication and enforcement." 
22
 Even this minimalist 
account allows for the importance of background conditions that structure interactions and 
institutions. 
23
  
An understanding of a basic structure of a system is essential to understanding the moral 
obligations that that system engenders.  Responsibility for something is typically understood to 
be based on causality. That is, I cannot have responsibility for something that I did not, in some 
way, cause. Thus, the basic structure is essential for determining the rightness of a course of 
action or institution.  As Pogge argues: 
Once this focus on a social system's basic structure has been fully understood, it 
has a strong claim to primacy within moral reflections quite apart from whether 
one believes in social contracts of free and equal moral personhood.  The reason 
is that we cannot, conceptually or causally, evaluate what we are doing to others 
without understanding the structure of the ground rules that give meaning to our 
actions and omissions and determine their (often remote) repercussions.
24
  
 
This addition is important in considering the existence and implications of a global basic 
structure.  Rawls’s discussion of basic structures is limited to the domestic sphere.  If a domestic 
                                                     
20
 Pogge 1989 21 
21
 Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia New York: Basic Books. 149 
22
 Ibid.  24 
23
 See my discussion of the Lockean proviso in Chapter 3 
24
 Ibid.  25 
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basic structure is the institutions and practices that provide the background justice for a liberal 
society, then the same principles must apply to the international case as well. 
 The question of an international global order has two parts.  First and foremost, what are 
the implications of the existence of a global basic structure for necessitating or influencing global 
justice? Second, and subsidiary to the first is the empirical question of whether or not a global 
basic structure akin to the domestic case really exists.
25
 Even if the answer to the latter question 
is no, the original analysis and discussion on implications of a potential global basic structure 
will still stand, both in the abstract and because I believe it is beyond contention that the world is 
ever more interconnected.  Thus, even if we do not live in a world with a global basic structure 
(though I will argue otherwise later), we may eventually get there, at which point an 
understanding of what kind of structures and institutions are morally required there will be 
necessary. 
 Charles Beitz argues for a “global normative order” akin to a global basic structure.  He 
contends that this global normative order is “the body of norms that are more-or-less widely 
accepted as regulative standards for conduct in various parts of global political space."
26
 Human 
rights, for instance, are part of this global order.
27
 This is a rather minimal understanding of the 
role of the global basic structure.  By only referencing norms, which do not carry the weight of 
treaties, laws, or other mechanisms of ratification or codification, the global basic structure is 
relatively weak. 
 Rawls takes a stronger stance on the global basic structure, arguing that the Law of 
Peoples, which exists to ensure global justice, "holds that inequalities are not always unjust, and 
that when they are, it is because of their unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society of 
                                                     
25
 I leave this question for chapter three. 
26
 Beitz, Charles.  2009.  The Idea of Human Rights.  Oxford University Press.  Oxford, UK.  209 
27
 Ibid.  209 
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Peoples.”28 In other words, inequalities are such because of their implications for the justice or 
injustice of the global basic structure.  This means that it is to the integrity of the global basic 
structure that we must appeal when determining the acceptableness of an institution or practice. 
 If there is a global basic structure, it must be concerned with global justice.  A non-moral 
structure would be, as Pogge argues, wholly insufficient.  If a global order is unconcerned with 
domestic justice: 
Since each state is sovereign over its internal affairs, this international order 
generates no countervailing forces that would resist the degeneration of a national 
basic structure.  Such institutional indifference to the domestic (in)justice of 
national regimes aggravates the instability of the proposed world order because it 
undermines the moral reasons for unconditional compliance with international 
laws and treaties.
29
  
 
According to Pogge, the reason that an international order of any kind is premised upon the 
strength of its moral claims.  If an international order has moral legitimacy, it must ensure 
justice.  Ensuring justice requires both recognition of the existence of a global basic structure, 
and also steps to ensure its justice. My project here, thus, attempts to reconcile deontological 
approaches to global justices with the global basic structure. 
 In chapter two, I offer summarized evaluations of the three primary deontological 
approaches to international justice: Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism.  In 
each account, I articulate the goals and methodology of the approach, and discuss how that 
approach accounts for global justice.  Moreover, I clarify distinctions within the competing 
accounts, distinguishing, for example, institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism. 
 In chapter three, I offer analysis of these three approaches in light of the global basic 
structure.  I argue that the deeply interconnected reality of international relations, trade, 
communication, and culture creates a global basic structure that gives rise to deep institutional 
                                                     
28
 Rawls 1999 113. Emphasis added 
29
 Pogge, Thomas.  1989.  Realizing Rawls.  Cornell University Press: 245 
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injustices.  An account of global justice, I contend, must account for this.  Within the Rawlsian 
framework, then, I hold that given the rise of the global basic structure, Rawls’s reasons for 
rejecting libertarianism in the domestic case are equally valid on the international level, and thus 
libertarianism cannot provide a just account of global justice in the Rawlsian sense.  
Furthermore, I argue that cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism would converge on an 
account of global justice that (1) holds states as the actors, (2) develops principles in an 
international original position, (3) has broad and inclusive principles of membership, (4) 
promotes a robust notion of human rights that constrains but preserves reasonable cultural 
pluralism, and (5) advocates egalitarian distributive principles.   
 In chapter four, I explore implications and objections to the proposal that I make in 
chapter three.  Within the Rawlsian framework, the primary objections stem from the concern 
that the model that I advocate does not achieve a realistic utopia.  The idea of a realistic utopia is 
the idea that political theory must promote institutions and actions that would be considered 
reasonable and rational to just constitutional democratic societies. In other words, a political 
theory satisfies the criterion of a realistic utopia if the theory could be achieved. For Rawls, it is 
vital not only that a political theory be just in theory, but also that just could be implemented in 
practice. The concern that my proposal is not a realistic utopia manifests into an implementation 
objection and a sustainability objection.  The implementation objection holds that the principles 
of international justice articulated here would never be achieved, because the empirical reality of 
power in the world would never allow for distributive justice or principles of cooperation that 
benefit the least well-off.  Put another way, the implementation objection holds that those that 
benefit from the global basic structure’s inequalities and injustices are those with power, and 
thus have no incentive to seek any kind of change to that structure. The sustainability objection 
Fetrow 16 
holds that the principles argued for here, even if implemented, would result in unacceptable or 
impractical outcomes and the international structure created would collapse in on itself. This 
objection holds that my proposal would necessitate open borders, which would cause separate 
states to collapse into a world state.  Because my theory is built with states as the actors in an 
international social contract, a collapse of states into a world state would necessarily collapse my 
argumentation. However, I reject both objections, arguing that neither understand nor 
meaningfully challenge my proposal. 
An additional objection to my argument is that the global basic structure is not 
comparable to the domestic basic structure, and thus the tension that I demonstrate and seek to 
resolve between Rawls’s domestic and international cases does not exist. If this tension does not 
exist, then the convergence that I advocate between cosmopolitan and Rawlsian liberal 
conceptions of global justice likewise cannot exist. However, I contend that, like realistic utopia 
objections, this objection is ultimately not compelling.   
 I conclude by drawing implications from my analysis and suggest some next steps in 
determining and promoting social justice.  I make suggestions for theorists in Rawlsian liberal 
and cosmopolitan camps and argue that further investigation ought be done both in determining 
policy implications of my theory and in exploring the implications of my argument beyond the 
scope of poverty and welfare that I am primarily concerned with here. 
 
  
Fetrow 17 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review: Cosmopolitan, Liberal, and Libertarian 
Approaches to Global Justice 
 
 
 
 Global justice is a complex topic that attracts philosophers from a variety of schools.  
Any attempt to understand it, thus, must begin with a discussion of these competing schools of 
thought.  There are three primary deontological approaches to global justice: Rawlsian 
liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism. I will discuss these approaches on a variety of 
levels, asking (1) How should a just international order be structured and who or what ought be 
the actors? (2) What is the scope of an international order? (3) What are the potential institutional 
implications? This discussion clarifies and informs the argumentation and position I take in 
subsequent chapters. 
The discussion of the global basic structure provided in chapter one is important because 
it frames and informs the three primary theories of a global basic structure I discuss below.  
Understanding the global basic structure is important because “it has such a profound influence 
upon who we are and our life prospects, and is necessary for background justice, the basic 
structure of society is the ‘first subject’ of justice: principles of justice apply directly to structure 
its basic structure are the political constitution; the legal system of trials, property, and contracts; 
the system of markets and regulation of economic relations; and the family.
1
  Thus, it is with this 
conception of a global basic structure in mind that I turn now to the discussion of the three 
primary perspectives on global justice. 
                                                     
1
 Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. Oxon: Routledge 464 
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In this chapter, I will discuss the three primary accounts of what global justice ought look 
like: Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, libertarianism.  In doing so, I seek to demonstrate 
the strengths and weaknesses of each view, the proposed structure and scope of each view, and 
roughly sketch the potential implications of each view.  I set aside the issue of utilitarianism, as I 
am primarily concerned here with more Kantian, deontological perspectives on global justice.
2
 
Moreover, because my focus is Rawls’s conception, my discussion of cosmopolitanism and 
libertarianism will be relational to Rawlsian liberalism. 
 
Rawlsian Liberalism 
 John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples argues for the application of a moderated version of his 
domestic liberalism in the international sphere.  This work encapsulates and creates the liberal 
conception of global justice.  Rawlsian liberalism develops from and is guided by Rawls, though, 
like any tradition, not all Rawlsian liberals agree with Rawls.  As Kantian may embrace Kant’s 
categorical imperative and emphasis on rationality, but reject Kant’s argument that one may not 
lie to a murderer at the door, so too may a Rawlsian liberal accept Rawls’s principles but dispute 
how they are applied.  Thus, I distinguish between Rawlsian liberals and Rawls himself.   
In its essence, the Law of Peoples that Rawls proposes is the system by which liberal 
peoples establish and maintain the principle of justice as fairness in the international realm.  Like 
the domestic case, the Law of Peoples is a hypothetical exercise.  However, unlike the domestic 
case, which is a contract between individuals, the Law of Peoples is “determined by a 
hypothetical contract… among the representatives of different nations.  They … are to be put 
behind a veil of ignorance regarding facts about themselves and their societies, and come to an 
                                                     
2
 For a utilitarian account of cosmopolitan moral duties, see: Singer, Peter.  2010.  The Life You Can 
Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty.  Random House: New York. 
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agreement upon principles of justice to regulate relations among different societies.”3 
Representatives of different groups, rather than the members of the groups themselves, enter into 
an original position and determine the principles of international justice.  Further, “parties in the 
international original position are motivated only by individual interests, in this case the interests 
of their individual nation.  But their interest is a moral one…maintaining the justice of their own 
basic structure.”4 Thus, the concerns at hand in the international original position are moral 
concerns, but domestic concerns.  The representatives of the different groups are concerned with 
securing and maintaining justice for their domestic structures, but not ensuring justice for people 
outside of their group.  
 Intriguingly, Rawls makes the actors represented by the representatives in the original 
position peoples, not states.  According to Rawls, peoples have three basic features.  They have 
“a reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests;" 
are “united by…common sympathies;” and have “a moral nature”.5 Buchanan further clarifies 
this distinction: “for Rawls, peoples are groups with their own states.”6 Thus, we can understand 
Rawls’s conception of peoples as moral, united in common sympathies, and contained with and 
fully containing of their own state.   This is important in creating a law of peoples, because 
Rawls argues that “the idea of peoples…enables us to attribute moral motives –an allegiance to 
the principles of a Law of Peoples, which, for instances, permits wars only of self-defense—to 
peoples (as actors), which we cannot do for states.”7 In the second original position, which 
                                                     
3
 Freeman 417-418 
4
 Ibid.  418 
5
 Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 23. 
6
 Buchanan, Allen.  2000.  “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World.  Ethics.” 
Vol.  110, No.  4.  Pp.  697-721: 698. 
7
 Rawls 1999 17. 
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constructs the just Law of Peoples, we must have moral actors, because, as in the first original 
position, “the parties are presumed to be capable of a sense of justice.”8  
States, on the other hand, “are often seen as rational, anxiously concerned with their 
power--their capacity (military, economic, diplomatic) to influence other states-- and always 
guided by their basic interests.”9 Rawls understands states as having full sovereignty over their 
domestic affairs.  Unlike peoples, who “must meet certain minimal standards…[of] human 
rights…in their internal affairs,”10 Rawls understands states as completely in control of their 
territory in the full Westphalian sense.  In short: the key difference between states and peoples as 
Rawls understands them is that peoples have moral natures and limited sovereignty, whereas 
states are amoral, self-interested, and have full domestic sovereignty.  Moreover, the salient 
difference between a ‘people’ and a ‘state’ is that peoples “are politically organized, and their 
form political organization is that of statehood, even if….they do not have all the traditional 
powers [of sovereignty] accorded to states.”11 
Rawls contends that the representatives of peoples would choose the following principles 
in order to achieve these goals: 
1.  Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to 
be respected by other peoples. 
2.  Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3.  Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4.  Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5.  Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons 
other than self-defense. 
6.  Peoples are to honor human rights.   
7.  Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8.  Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions 
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
12
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These principles exist to ensure that the rules are “acceptable to reasonable peoples who are thus 
diverse and it must be fair between them and effective in shaping the larger schemes of their 
cooperation.”13 The value of these rules, and their restrictions, is to ensure reasonable pluralism 
in a world order, a cornerstone of the Law of Peoples.   
 Reasonable pluralism is the idea that people can hold different opinions on an issue, and 
be convinced of the rightness of their position, and still accept that the other position is a valid 
and acceptable position to take.
14
 Rawls emphasizes the importance of reasonable pluralism in 
his Law of Peoples because he seeks to create a realistic utopia.  In order to achieve this, he says 
we must “take people as they are.”15 Given the fact of reasonable pluralism—that is, though not 
all people agree on culture, religion, or morality, the views that they take can tolerate the 
existence of other views and perspectives—reasonable pluralism must have a central role in an 
international account. 
 The value of reasonable pluralism is complicated by the existence of non-liberal peoples.  
Rawls holds that “a main task in extending the Law of Peoples to nonliberal peoples is to specify 
how far liberal peoples are to tolerate nonliberal peoples.”16 By ‘tolerate’, Rawls means “to 
recognize these nonliberal societies as equal participating members in good standing of the 
Society of Peoples, with certain rights and obligations, including the duty of civility requiring 
that they offer other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their 
actions."
17
 A Law of Peoples cannot require that all peoples are liberal, because doing so “would 
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fail to express the toleration for other acceptable ways of ordering society.”18 Thus, the principle 
of toleration requires that the law of peoples allow for reasonable pluralism. 
 There are, however, limits to such pluralism.  Rawls contends that, though denying 
respect and autonomy to other groups requires very important reasons in order to be justifiable, 
peoples cannot deny their members basic human rights, nor may they “deny their members the 
right to be consulted or a substantial political role in making decisions.”19 This is because 
consultation is necessary for a society to be well-ordered, and only well-ordered societies have 
the capacity to participate in the Law of Peoples.  Rawls defines human rights as a set of 
“necessary, though not sufficient, standard for the decency of domestic political and social 
institutions.”20 Thus, human rights are necessary for the following: 
1. Their fulfillment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society's 
political institutions and of its legal order. 
2. Their fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by 
other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave 
cases by military force. 
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among peoples.21 
 
Human rights, therefore, are understood as the limits on the reasonable pluralism that 
underscores the law of peoples.  The limitations on participation in the Law of Peoples are most 
directly relevant to the inclusion of decent hierarchical and burdened peoples, outlaw states, and 
benevolent absolutisms.   
Rawls’s stated aim is to “extend the law of peoples to decent societies and to show that 
they accept the same Law of Peoples that liberal societies do.  This shared law describes the kind 
of Society of Peoples that all liberal and decent societies want, and it expresses the regulative 
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end of their foreign policies.”22 A decent hierarchical society, according to Rawls, fulfills two 
criteria.  First, decent peoples do not have aggressive aims, that is, they do not attempt to invade, 
colonize, or engage in war with other peoples or states.
23
 The second criterion has three 
components.  First, “a decent hierarchical people’s system of law, in accordance with its 
common good idea of justice…secures for all members of the people what have come to be 
called human rights.”24 In other words, a decent hierarchical society protects basic human rights.  
Second, a decent hierarchical society imposes moral duties and obligations on its people.
25
 It 
requires its people to fulfill roles within that society according to moral obligations.  Moreover, 
the people in a decent hierarchical society recognize these obligations, rather than acting merely 
out of fear of punishment.
26
  Third and finally, “there must be a sincere and not unreasonable 
belief on the part of judges and other officials who administer the legal system that the law is 
indeed guided by a common good idea of justice.”27 That is, those that enforce the law must 
believe they do so in the interest of justice, not merely personal gain.   
Decent peoples, furthermore, generally have a “decent consultation hierarchy,” though he 
holds in reserve the possibility of a decent people that does not have this feature yet still remains 
decent.
28
 Importantly, decent peoples are “associationalist in form: … the members of these 
societies are viewed in public life as members of different groups, and each group is represented 
in the legal system by a body in a decent consultation hierarchy.”29 Often, these groups are based 
on religious ideology and beliefs, wherein certain religious groups or groups delineated by 
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religion are the units of consultation, rather than individual peoples.  Thus, consultation happens 
through groups, not through individuals as it does in liberal societies.  The system that this 
organization structure engenders may not be liberal.  For instance, women or minority groups 
may face social restrictions or be banned from public office.  However, because their structure 
still enables liberal societies to interact with them—they have moral tendencies and a 
consultation hierarchy, they are sufficiently well-ordered to deserve equal participation in the 
Law of Peoples.   
Outlaw states, by contrast, are regimes that refuse to comply with the principles of a Law 
of Peoples.
30
 In other words, they either pursue aggressive policies internationally through 
waging war or other acts that infringe on liberal states, or violate the human rights of those 
within their borders.  Outlaw states are not just a threat to their own citizens, but also to the Law 
of Peoples more broadly, because they are “aggressive and dangerous; all people are safer and 
more secure if such states change, or are forced to change, their ways.  Otherwise, they deeply 
affect the international climate of power and violence.”31 Rawls argues that “an outlaw state that 
violates … [human] rights is to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful 
sanctions and even to intervention” with the intention of making the society honor human rights 
and become a full member of the Law of Peoples.
32
 Thus, liberal and decent peoples “simply do 
not tolerate outlaw states.  This refusal…is a consequence of liberalism and decency.”33 Rawls’s 
position on outlaw states both entrenches the importance of human rights in his account, and also 
defines the limits of tolerance of pluralism: while the non-liberal consultation hierarchies of 
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decent peoples are allowable under Rawlsian reasonable pluralism, the absolute disregard for 
human rights of outlaw societies is not. 
Societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, or burdened societies, present yet another 
facet of Rawls’s non-ideal theory.  For Rawls, “burdened societies…lack the political and 
cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological 
resources needed to be well-ordered.”34 While the eventual goal of liberal societies ought to be to 
allow these societies to liberalize, for Rawls, this does not necessitate a distributive principle, 
because “a society with few natural resources and little wealth can be well-ordered if its political 
traditions, law, and property and class structure with their underlying religious and moral beliefs 
and culture are such as to sustain a liberal or decent society.”35 Members of a Law of Peoples 
have a duty of assistance to aid burdened societies, but this duty “may stop once just…basic 
institutions have been established.”36 On Rawls’s account, this duty is based not on ideals of 
justice and reciprocity, but rather on respect for human rights, and the desire to promote rights 
even outside of liberal societies.   
Finally, Rawls briefly mentions benevolent absolutisms, which “honor most human 
rights, but because they deny their members a meaningful role in making political decision, they 
are not well-ordered.”37 In other words, though benevolent absolutisms are non-aggressive and 
honor human rights, they are not well-ordered insofar as their citizens have no role in the 
political process.  Thus, are excluded from a Law of Peoples because they are not well-ordered. 
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These distinctions between different ‘types’ of peoples and states are structurally 
important to a Rawlsian liberal account of international justice.  They define the limits on 
participation, and thus the scope, of international justice for Rawls. 
 Rawls is not the only advocate for Rawlsian liberalism in global justice.  Allen Buchanan, 
for instance, agrees with the core foundations of Rawls’s argument, yet disputes some of Rawls’s 
conclusions.  Buchanan holds that using peoples rather than states “courts confusion: given that 
the term ‘people’ is often used to refer to ethnic or national groups, including those that lack their 
own states.”38 States, according to Buchanan, are not the sovereign, Westphalian monoliths that 
Rawls envisions.  Thus, Buchanan does not find “it necessary to reject the term ‘state’ and 
replace it with the word ‘people’.”39 Buchanan identifies what he terms a “fundamental lack” in 
The Law of Peoples: “the lack of principles of international distributive justice.”40 Buchanan 
holds that essential to an effective law of peoples is an understanding that the global basic 
structure influences people’s lives similarly to domestic structures.  He argues that the global 
basic structure’s existence is sufficient to merit its regulation by the principles of justice.  He 
thus advocates that participants in the international original position would consider how the 
global basic structure would affect their group, and “strive to ensure that their societies are not 
disadvantaged by the global basic structure.”41  They would thus “avoid principles that might 
turn out to assign them to an inferior status” in that global basic structure.42 Thus, Buchanan 
argues for a more egalitarian and connected understanding of global justice through the lens of 
Rawlsian liberalism. 
                                                     
38
 Buchanan 2000 699 
39
 Ibid.  699 
40
 Ibid.  701 
41
 Buchanan 2000 708 
42
 Ibid.  708 
Fetrow 27 
 Similarly, Wilfred Hinsch argues for an egalitarian form of Rawls’s law of peoples, 
proposing amending the law of peoples to include a form of federalism.
43
 Hinsch’s two-tiered 
federal system would require greater duties of assistance than Rawls’s more minimalist proposal, 
but would maintain separate states (as opposed to a world state).
44
 It would also require “global 
redistribution in conformity with the Difference Principle.”45 Because of the interconnected 
nature of the global basic structure, Hinsch argues, we have an obligation to greater egalitarian 
principles.
46
 
 The importance of examining alternative perspectives on Rawlsian liberalism is that it 
demonstrates that Rawls’s Law of Peoples may be used in more egalitarian forms.  In other 
words, simply because Rawls does not include discussion of the global basic structure, or allow 
for redistributive principles in his international contract does not mean that including them would 
undermine or flow against his theory overall. 
 In the next chapter I shall explore this approach further, adding to it the centrality of the 
global basic structure.  Given the global basic structure’s similarity in its scope, breadth, and 
impact to the domestic basic structure, I argue, a Rawlsian liberal account of global justice would 
converge with a cosmopolitan account in order to stay to stay true to the methodology and 
mission of Rawlsian liberalism as well as with reality. 
 
Cosmopolitanism 
 The second main deontological approach to global justice is cosmopolitanism.  
Cosmopolitanism’s central premise is that all persons, regardless of nationality or other 
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distinctions, must be the ultimate unit for moral consideration.  There are two sets of distinctions 
within cosmopolitanism that provide nuance to a cosmopolitan understanding of global justice: 
moral and legal cosmopolitanism; and institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism.
47
 
 At its core, cosmopolitanism has three fundamental aspects: individualism, universality, 
and generality.
48
 Individualism holds that “the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or 
persons.”49 Universality holds that “the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living 
human equally,” thus not preferring one over another based on membership in some subset such 
as race, gender, socioeconomic class.
50
 Finally, generality holds that this concern for all persons 
has “global force,” rather than being limited by nationality or region.51  Cosmopolitan theorists 
of global justice, thus, “hold that there is nothing morally special about political boundaries,” and 
so our moral obligations are neither defined by or end at these boundaries.
52
  
The first important distinction in cosmopolitan theories of global justice is the distinction 
between moral and legal cosmopolitanism.  Legal cosmopolitanism “is committed to a concrete 
political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, 
that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic.”53 In other words, legal cosmopolitanism 
requires strong international institutions that treat all persons equally and justly.   Moral 
cosmopolitanism, by contrast, “holds that all persons stand in certain moral relations to one 
another: we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern—a 
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requirement that imposes limits…upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes.”54 These 
limits may be different, however, from the strong international institutions required by legal 
cosmopolitanism.  Importantly, “the central idea of moral cosmopolitanism is that every human 
being has a global stature as an ultimate unity of moral concern.”55 Yet, we may simply define 
moral cosmopolitanism “in terms of human rights,” rather than by institutional mechanisms.56 
Note that these two views are compatible, not mutually exclusive, and may address different 
aspects of global justice. 
The second important distinction is between institutional and interactional 
cosmopolitanism.  Institutional cosmopolitanism “postulates certain fundamental principles of 
justice [that]…apply to institutional schemes and are thus second-order principles: standards for 
assessing the ground rules and practices that regulate human interaction.”57 In other words, 
institutional cosmopolitanism deals with the background structure and institutions that guide and 
shape human interactions, rather than with the character of those institutions themselves.  It 
provides a mechanism to evaluate or create this basic structure such that each person is treated 
fairly and justly.  Interactional cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, “postulates certain 
fundamental principles of justice…[that] apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups.”58 
A useful way in which to consider the difference between institutional and interactional 
cosmopolitanism is that institutional cosmopolitanism operates on the macro level, analyzing 
institutions.  On this perspective, human rights “impose constraints on shared practices.”59 
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Conversely, interactional cosmopolitanism operates on the micro level, wherein human rights 
constrain conduct and specific individual actions.
60
  
Most relevant to the discussion of global justice is institutional cosmopolitanism.  Given 
the essential nature of the basic structure described above, an account of global justice must 
meaningfully deal with the institutions that create this structure.  Thus, henceforth, when I refer 
to cosmopolitanism, I refer to institutional cosmopolitanism. 
Moral institutional cosmopolitanism holds that because human rights exist within the 
context of a global basic structure that affects and is affected by every person, violations of rights 
are “everyone’s concern.”61 In other words,  “institutional interconnections…render obsolete the 
idea that countries can peacefully agree to disagree about justice, each committing itself to a 
conception of justice appropriate to its history, culture, population side and density, natural 
environment, geopolitical context, and stage of development."
62
 Even with reasonable pluralism, 
there must be a universal conception of justice for the global basic structure, because global 
institutions "can at any time only be structured in one way.”63 Further, institutions cannot be 
assessed for their justice individually, because of the interconnectedness of the network of justice 
(or injustice) that they create.  It is the overall system and structure that must be evaluated.
64
 
Moreover, claims about the justice or injustice of system and its institutions must “be based on 
an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected” by those 
institutions or structure.”65  
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And yet cosmopolitan theorists differ on their approach to global justice.  Some, such as 
Luis Cabrera, embrace a world government, arguing for an integrated world system both socially 
and economically.
66
 Cabrera, however, is in the minority among cosmopolitans.  Even Brian 
Barry, who advocates a form of international federalism akin to the existing European Union, 
shies away from embracing a world without borders.
67
 Instead, cosmopolitans tend towards 
different levels of regulations between nations, embracing the pragmatic benefits to individuals 
of a localized government that can best understand and respond to their individual cultural needs.  
Moreover, “the world government approach reflects "the dogma of absolute sovereignty," which 
cosmopolitans seek to avoid, because of the human rights abuses it engenders.
68
  The fact of 
states, however, does not lend them moral weight as it does in Rawlsian liberalism.  Instead, 
institutions like states derive their legitimacy from their ability to support human rights and 
increase general human welfare.
69
 Thus, implications of a cosmopolitan perspective tend towards 
cosmopolitan liberalism. 
Cosmopolitan liberalism adopts the hypothetical contract of Rawlsian liberalism, with the 
difference that the actors in the international original position are individuals, rather than peoples 
(or states).  Cosmopolitans agree that the principles that individuals would pick egalitarian 
principles of economic redistribution.  Pogge calls for a global resource tax that taxes 
consumption and uses the funds raised to aid those least well-off.
70
 Beitz calls for distributive 
justice and duties of assistance to ensure reciprocity.
71
 Barry contends that individuals in a global 
original position would choose principles that include equal rights to natural resources, taxes on 
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resource extraction, and international income tax on gross domestic product.
72
 What 
cosmopolitans do agree upon, however, is that global justice requires economic, rather than 
merely social reciprocity and justice.   
Cosmopolitanism is an umbrella term for several forms of the theory.  The implications 
of the different branches of the theory, while varied in their particulars, are all built around the 
essential nature of the individual as a moral actor.  Thus, a cosmopolitan approach to global 
justice calls for redistribution and other economic measures to create basic structural equality in 
the global basic structure in order to promote the rights of individual persons.   
In the next chapter, I draw upon this discussion of cosmopolitanism in order to develop a 
coherent approach to international justice given agreement between cosmopolitanism and 
Rawlsian liberalism in the context of the global basic structure.   
 
Libertarianism 
 The third and final deontological approach to global justice is libertarianism.  If Rawlsian 
liberalism sits in the middle, with cosmopolitanism pulling towards greater egalitarianism, 
libertarianism pulls the other direction, arguing for less governmental reach and thus greater 
liberty.  Libertarianism holds that persons are autonomous agents who own themselves and can 
acquire property rights.  The government (or an international structure) commits an injustice 
when it limits or restricts these property rights.  There are three principle branches of 
libertarianism: Nozick’s entitlement theory, mutual advantage theory, and libertarianism as 
liberty. 
 Robert Nozick argues that “individuals have rights, and there are things no person or 
group may do to them (without violating their rights).”73 Thus, institutional intervention on 
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persons must be minimal.  “For Nozick, social justice requires that governments interfere as little 
as possible with private arrangements, and devote themselves instead to protecting such 
arrangements.” 74 In other words, government’s function is to allow people to enter into free 
agreements with others, providing only minimal protection or limitations on the content or form 
of such agreements.  Thus, Nozick holds that “the minimal state is the most extensive state that 
can be justified.  Any state more extensive violates people’s rights.”75 A minimal state (or its 
international equivalent) must therefore be narrow, restricted, and very limited.  Further, Nozick 
argues that “there is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the 
resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.”76 In other words, because people are 
equal, no one person or group has the right to determine which persons get which goods.  
Allowing a larger government would thus violate rights of individuals.   
 On a libertarian perspective, there is no basic structure of either a domestic society or of 
the international community in the full sense that Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans contend. 
Instead, any institutions or norms are “the product of many individual decisions which the 
different individuals are entitled to make.”77 It is not, as perceived by Rawlsian liberals and 
cosmopolitans, the result of a network of interlocking institutions and practices, but rather a 
collection of individual choices operating independently.  In this framework, regulative control 
of the basic structure is unnecessary and infringes upon the rights of individuals. 
 One of the primary implications of the libertarian stance on the basic structure is that 
libertarians reject (nearly) any form of distributive justice advocated by Rawlsian or 
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cosmopolitan liberals.  In fact, “Robert Nozick stands as one of the foremost intellectual 
antagonists to claims for distributive justice”78 For Nozick, Rawls’s retributive principle in the 
domestic case is flawed because: “(1) Rawlsian redistribution (or other coercive government 
interventions in market exchanged) is incompatible with recognizing people as self-owners.  
Only unrestricted capitalism recognizes self-ownership.  (2) Recognizing people as self-owners 
is crucial to treating people as equals.”79 In other words, when government structures take 
legitimately earned property away from individuals, they deny the right to self-ownership of 
individuals, an inexcusable violation of liberty.   
 Instead of redistributive justice, Nozick proposes a three part entitlement theory.   In a 
just world, all holdings would follow the following principles: First, “a person who acquires a 
holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.”80 In 
other words, as long as the property was acquired legitimately (not, for instance, stolen), the 
possessor has a right to it.  Second, “a person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the 
holding.”81 Hence, the person who holds something has the right to dispose of it as he or she 
will.  Finally, “no one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of [the first two 
principles].”82 Thus, governmental bodies are not entitled to involvement and distribution of 
property, because doing is a violation of the rights of those who had the property before it was 
redistributed.   Further, “Nozick believes that self-ownership inevitably leads to unrestricted 
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property-rights.”83 Governments ought not limit or restrict property rights, therefore, either at the 
domestic or global level. Thus, he argues, “the choice of economic regime should be 
decided…by the consent of self-owning people…self-owning people would all choose a 
libertarian regime, if it were up to them.”84 He accepts, thus, the mechanism for determining 
social cooperation.  Where he differs, then, is on the implications, rather than the structure or 
framework of the question. 
 Nozick offers an influential and important perspective on libertarianism, yet his is not the 
only perspective.  While Nozick’s is most directly in contrast to Rawlsian libertarianism, and 
thus most relevant to my discussion, I will briefly explain the other two main branches of 
libertarianism in order to provide nuance and accuracy to my discussion. 
The second principle form of libertarianism is mutual advantage theory.  Like Nozick’s 
entitlement theory, “mutual advantage theorists…use a contract device, but for opposite reasons 
[than Rawls].  For them, there are no natural duties or self-originating moral claims.  There is no 
moral equality underneath out natural physical inequality.”85 The social contract is merely a 
useful device insofar as it benefits everyone.  Because all participants benefit, the contract is 
formed.  There is, however, no moral underpinning to the contract.  This is in stark opposition to 
Rawlsian liberalism.  Rawls argues that contracts are unjustified if one participant stands to 
benefit disproportionately, because this type of contract is coercive and does not adhere to the 
principle of fairness.  By contrast, mutual advantage libertarianism holds that all types of 
contracts are allowable if both parties stand to benefit—regardless of the relative distribution of 
those benefits.  Mutual advantage theory is also fundamentally different from Nozick’s Lockean 
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libertarianism. Indeed, like Rawls, Nozick argues that his entitlement theory also has Kantian 
foundations because it treats each person as end and not a mere means. However, like 
entitlement theory, mutual advantage libertarianism rejects the essential nature of the basic 
structure in determining the background conditions that determine the justice or injustice of 
specific actions.   
The third and final branch of libertarianism is libertarianism as liberty.  This 
understanding of liberty holds that liberty is the highest value of justice, and that the only way 
for a governmental structure to respect that is to allow for free markets and extremely limited 
government involvement in individual decision-making.
86
  This argument has three parts.  First, 
it holds that “an unrestricted market involves more freedom.”87 Freedom, or liberty, must be the 
highest priority of justice because it respects individuals’ right to autonomy and free choice.  
Thus, a free market and corollary minimal government obligation is morally obligatory.
88
 
 These three branches of libertarianism have much in common: they all reject proposals of 
distributive justice proposed by cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals.  Instead, they argue that a 
property holder has an absolute right to his or her property.  Further, they reject the importance 
of a basic structure—domestic or international—in determining background conditions for 
justice.  While they agree with liberals in that the mechanism for determining a government 
structure is contractual, libertarians contend that self-owning individuals would choose principles 
of minimalist governance.  In addressing global justice, thus, libertarians advocate no 
international structures or other norms for affecting the global basic structure, insofar as they 
deny its importance, and the legitimacy of attempts to regulate it.  
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In the following chapters, I focus primarily on Nozick’s conception of libertarianism, 
because it is the most prevalent branches of the theory and most directly and explicitly clashes 
with cosmopolitan and Rawlsian liberal accounts of justice. In the next chapter, I will explain 
Rawls’s rejection of libertarianism in the domestic case and argue that his acceptance of 
libertarian principles in the international case is both inconsistent with his domestic theory of 
justice and unsustainably asymmetrical. I hold that Rawls’s reasons for rejecting libertarianism 
in the domestic case are sound and ought to be applied to the international realm. 
 
Conclusion 
 Determining the best way to approach the problem of global justice requires a complete 
and nuanced understanding of the concepts, terms, and approaches in the field.  Justice 
understood in terms of fairness and reciprocity on the global level requires acknowledgment of 
the existence and importance of the global basic structure, a network of institutions, practices, 
and norms that guide and shape social, political, and economic processes around the globe.  The 
three primary approaches to solving this problem are Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and 
libertarianism.  Rawlsian liberalism holds principally that representatives of peoples in a 
hypothetical international original position would select principles that balance the value and 
importance of human rights with principles of toleration of reasonable pluralism.  
Cosmopolitanism differs from Rawlsian liberalism in that the ultimate units of moral concern, 
and thus the actors in the original position must be individuals, and that they would choose more 
egalitarian principles of mutual cooperation.  Conversely, libertarians hold that the principles that 
would arise out of any type of social contract would be principles of minimalist government 
involvement.   
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 Importantly, Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism agree on the essential nature of 
the basic structure, while libertarians reject distributive justice at both a domestic and 
international level based on the belief in individual right to ownership and autonomy.  Moreover, 
all three approaches agree on the mechanism of a contract, though they come to it from different 
perspectives, as well as the centrality of justice in determining the right framework for a global 
society.  I accept these points of (relative) agreement: the mechanism of the contract, the 
centrality of justice, and the importance of the global basic structure.  In going forward, thus, I 
ask: given the nature of justice and the (empirical or theoretical) nature of the global basic 
structure, what principles of mutual cooperation best promote institutional justice on the global 
level? 
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Chapter 3: A Just Global Basic Structure: Rawlsian Liberalism with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose 
 
 
 Just as justice in a domestic society requires the consideration and regulation of the 
domestic basic structure, so too does justice on the international level require dealing with the 
reality of a global basic structure.  And there is a global basic structure.  From buying groceries 
to investing in growing international markets, the lives of individuals as well as the actions of 
governments are deeply and increasingly tied to global networks that rest upon this basic 
structure.  Moreover, the existence of the global basic structure is “documented in a vast and 
growing interdisciplinary literature that goes under various headings: globalization, structural 
dependency, and theory of underdevelopment.”1 Its existence is recognized in the creation of 
bodies like the United Nations, NAFTA, and NATO.  It is entrenched by international treaties 
like the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which holds that “everyone is entitled to a 
social and international in order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration 
can be fully realized.”2  The global basic structure is important for two primary reasons.  First, it 
directly impacts opportunities, resources, and abilities of individuals and states.  Second, it 
influences the domestic basic structure, further limiting and defining options and abilities of 
domestic parties.   
 The global basic structure has a direct impact on the opportunities of individuals and 
states.  Trade agreements and tariffs, for example, are all built in the context of the global basic 
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structure.  International watchdog groups limit the actions of governmental agencies by 
publicizing and denouncing human rights abuses.  The internet’s ability to facilitate 
communications around the world instantaneously has dramatically influenced global culture and 
discourse, thereby affecting not just opportunities but cultures, identities, and characters as well.  
We live in a deeply and increasingly interconnected world.  Any account of global justice must 
thus take this into account, for, as Buchanan argues, “there is simply no reason to believe that a 
global basic structure that is not regulated by principles of justice will happen to ensure that 
every well-governed society will be so distributionally autonomous as to be able to see that … 
standards [of justice are] met for all its citizens.”3 Just as we regulate the basic structures of 
domestic society in order to ensure fair background conditions, we must similarly regulate the 
global basic structure.   
Moreover, the global basic structure affects the domestic basic structure, both directly 
and indirectly influencing opportunities.  This happens in two ways.  First, a state that has its 
economic growth opportunities benefited by the global basic structure, like the United States or 
Europe, reaps social and political benefits as well.  Conversely, a state that is systematically 
harmed by the global basic structure stands to suffer not only economically but also politically 
and socially.  For instance, "the probability that democracy survives increases monotonically 
with per capita income…No democracy ever fell in a country with a per capita income higher 
than that of Argentina in 1975, $6,055."
4
 In other words, when economic opportunities are 
limited by the global basic structure, the just political structure of democracy is unlikely to 
obtain.  Political and social stability, including Rawls’s “stability for the right reasons,” is 
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dependent upon a fair and just global basic structure.
5
 Second, political and social elements of 
the global basic structure influence the opportunities of states, peoples, and individuals.  
Consider trade, wherein pressure for free trade which benefits the consumers (generally in the 
powerful West) puts pressure on developing nations in regions like Southeast Asia to maintain 
low or no minimum wage laws or workplace safety regulations in order to attract business.  Even 
more perniciously, “relative poverty breeds corruptibility and corruption.”6 In other words, poor 
governments “are actively being corrupted, continually and very significantly, by private and 
official agents from vastly more wealthy societies.”7 Thus, the global basic structure has indirect 
effects on domestic societies, as well as direct effects. 
 One might argue that even though the world is increasingly interconnected, the global 
basic structure is still less pervasive and powerful than domestic structures, and thus does not 
need the type of regulation that domestic societies require in order to be just.  This 
counterargument is flawed for two reasons.
8
  First, as Charles Beitz notes: “the claim that a 
society’s domestic and political character is a more important determinant of individual well-
being than its international economic position presupposes a capacity to distinguish between 
domestic and international influences which may be impossible to sustain.”9 In other words, 
because of the interconnected nature of the domestic and global basic structures, whether or not 
the ultimate cause of a limitation or opportunity is domestic or global is impossible to determine 
in many cases.  Regardless, however, the reality of the increasingly interconnected nature of the 
global community is sufficient reason to support a theory of international justice that accounts 
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for a global basic structure.  Moreover, the arguments for the existence and influence of the 
global basic structure are even stronger now, in 2013 than they were when Pogge or Beitz argued 
for recognition of the global basic structure in the 1990s.  The rise of the internet age has 
accelerated the interconnectedness of information networks, trade networks, and political 
alliances.  Furthermore, as global climate concerns threaten all states, the global community is 
even further incentivized to work together to solve problems that belong not to an individual 
society, but to the world at large.  Global climate change has international causes and thus 
requires international solutions.   My argument holds, therefore, because even if I am wrong 
about the current existence of the global basic structure, the trajectory of the global community is 
increasingly interconnected, and this interconnectedness must be accounted for. 
 Given the existence of a global basic structure, the questions of distributive justice that 
arise in the domestic case because of the domestic basic structure must arise in the international 
case.  As Buchanan argues, if there is a global basic structure…then surely it is a subject of 
justice and a very important one.”10 Thus, schemes of international justice must begin by 
recognizing the centrality of the global basic structure. 
 It is worth, at this point, noting three important facts about the global basic structure.  
First, the justice of the global basic structure is prior to social and economic arrangements.  A 
just global basic structure consists primarily of preventing unjust distributions from occurring, 
rather than primarily correcting or compensating for unjust distributions.  As Pogge argues: 
We should aim for a set of…ground rules under which each participant would be 
able to meet her basic social and economic needs…[These] ground rules…are 
prior to both production and distribution and therefore involve neither the idea of 
an already existing pool of stuff to be doled out nor the idea of already owned 
resources to be redistributed.
11
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A just global basic structure, then, must be established and maintained by institutions and norms 
that preexist other contractual agreements, economic exchanges, or political treaties.   Liberals 
agree on this score.  As Pogge notes, "when Rawls claims that economic inequalities prevailing 
in developed Western societies are unjust, he is not envisioning that…wealth is to be transferred 
or redistributed to the poor.  Rather, the point is to change the economic institutions that govern 
the distribution of resources (and give rise to excessive inequalities) in the first place."
12
  
 Secondly, the global basic structure is multifaceted and multidimensional.  Just regulation 
of the global basic structure would require regulation of different aspects of social and economic 
life.  For example, regulatory bodies must monitor, among other things, human rights, trade 
agreements, environmental protections, and telecommunications.  While the guiding principles 
behind these disparate aspects of life are unified, the manifestations of these principles will vary 
depending on the realm in which they operate.  Thus, in considering the global basic structure, it 
is important to remember that it is complicated and multifaceted.  The plurality of spheres on 
which it operates create different requirements and different structures within the umbrella of the 
broad global basic structure. 
 Third and finally, moral obligations that arise in a global basic structure are not based on 
duties of beneficence or charity, but based on common cause.  By perpetuating a system that 
advantages some at the expense of others, we contribute to the inequalities and injustices in the 
global basic structure.  Rectifying them, thus, is not charity, but a moral obligation based on 
duties of justice and reciprocity.  Hence, “we are asked to be concerned about human rights 
violations not simply insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are produced by social 
institutions in which we are significant participants.”13  
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 Of the three approaches discussed in the previous chapter—Rawlsian liberalism, 
cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism—only two capture the existence and significance of the 
global basic structure.  Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism both understand the essential 
nature of a basic structure.  Libertarianism, on the other hand, fails to appreciate the moral 
significance of the basic structure, so it cannot be the best way to understand and explicate our 
obligations.  Libertarians assume that our actions are uniquely our own; no external structures 
have influence enough over them to mitigate our ownership of ourselves.  Yet given the basic 
structure, this is simply not true.  Actions of individuals and governments are limited by the basic 
structure.  A child born in Somalia has vastly different chances than a child born in the United 
States, because of political, economic, and social factors that have led to advantages or 
disadvantages systematically enforced by the global basic structure.  Even if Nozick is correct 
that an individual may own his or her entire self, including labors and rewards of that labor, this 
is still clearly not true for states.  As Beitz contends, “we hold individual persons responsible for 
the consequences of their own decisions because persons have the capacity for identity over 
time—the person who made a decision at one time and who suffers the consequences at a later 
time is the same person.  But societies are unlike individual persons in this regard.”14 In other 
words, even if Nozick’s hard-line individualism applies for individual actions, state actions 
cannot be held to the same account, because those who passed policies and those who reap the 
rewards or benefits of those policies are not the same.  Because libertarianism fails to account for 
the centrality of the global basic structure in an account of global justice, it is not an adequate 
mechanism to determine justice. 
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In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explicitly rejects libertarian arguments.  Rawls argues that 
libertarianism is illiberal and therefore unacceptable.
15
 All people are “free and equal” and a just 
government must “maintain the conditions for realizing this ideal of persons.”16 In constructing 
an understanding of justice in the international sphere, thus, I take Rawls’s criticism of 
libertarianism on face, in addition to the arguments presented above.  Thus, in determining a 
construction of global justice that is consistent with Rawlsian basic principles, I set aside 
libertarianism as incapable of dealing with the reality of the global basic structure.    
Cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism both have the capacity to consider the 
essentialness of the global basic structure.  Both account for the reality that shapes and defines 
global justice, and both seek justice through the lens of justice-as-fairness that extends across 
borders and continents.  Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism both understand the essential 
nature of a basic structure.  For instance, Rawls’s domestic case forbids contracts made under the 
context of a coercive basic structure.
17
 Similarly, cosmopolitans seek to unite the world’s moral 
duties precisely because of the pervasive and influencing nature of the global basic structure.  
Both of these frameworks are consistent with the framework that Rawls provides in A Theory of 
Justice designed to promote justice as fairness.  I argue that the best account of global justice can 
be reached by achieving a convergence of cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism.  Through 
this overlapping consensus, international moral obligations can be understood. 
There are three questions to be asked in developing and understanding this overlapping 
consensus.  The first is who are the actors? That is, who gets to decide and agree upon a global 
basic structure? On this point, cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals disagree.  The second 
question is what is the structure? That is, how would the actors develop the principles of 
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international cooperation and global justice? Third and finally, what are the principles? What 
principles, rules, limitations, and guidelines would be established by these actors in this 
structure? In this final and most essential question, I argue that cosmopolitans and Rawlsian 
liberals would converge and agree. 
  
Actors 
 There are three potential answers to the question of who the actors might be: individuals, 
peoples, and states.  Cosmopolitans tend to favor individuals insofar as, for cosmopolitans, 
individuals are the ultimate moral unit, the actors to which the benefits of a system of 
international system must accrue.  Thus, it makes sense for the moral actors to be individuals. 
 However, holding that the actor in an international cooperation scheme must be the 
individual does not follow from the belief that individuals ought be the unit of moral worth.  
Even if individuals are the only morally valuable entity, the institutions may be constructed 
around different actors.  On this account, “there is no inconsistency in holding both that the 
ultimate appeal in questions of international justice is to the other interests of individual persons 
and that, for political…reasons, we must regard a decentralized world order [the existence of 
states] and work for reforms within its basic structure.”18 There is a distinction between the 
moral agent—she who the international scheme must protect and whose interests ought be 
advanced—and the moral actor—she who directly constructs, regulates, and maintains the 
international scheme.  It is not necessary to the cosmopolitan account, thus, that individuals be 
the actors.   
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 Thus, some cosmopolitans “make countries, rather than individuals the units.”19 The 
reason for this is that individuals are in inefficient and impractical mechanism for constructing an 
international order to regulate the global basic structure.  Barry compares the use of states in 
constructing an international order to the use of families in the domestic case, arguing that even 
in a domestic society “we do not really think of the distribution…as a distribution among 
individuals but among families.”20 The system of cooperation at the domestic level is among 
families, much as, Barry contends, a successful international contract would be between states.
21
 
By distinguishing between moral actors and agents, this distinction is not only possible, but 
preferable.  Beitz, too, supports this view of cosmopolitanism, arguing that we “conceive of the 
international community as a society of (domestic-level) societies characterized by division of 
labor: domestic societies are responsible for the well-being of their people.”22 Cosmopolitans, 
therefore, may embrace a system of international cooperation that uses states as actors, while 
maintaining their ethical emphasis on rights and liberties of individuals. 
Cosmopolitans are incentivized to place this emphasis on states because of the pragmatic 
benefits of doing so.  States are beneficial from two perspectives: implementation and 
maintenance.  States are the most prevalent actors in the current international system.  Thus, 
implementing a system of international cooperation is aided by the utilization of the system of 
states already in place.  In other words, because states are the dominant actors in the existing 
global basic structure, as well as schemes of international cooperation already in place, the use of 
states as actors makes pragmatic sense in the transition from the current system to a system that 
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would create and propagate a just global basic structure.  Second, using states aids cosmopolitan 
goals of maintenance of a just system of social cooperation on the global level.  Tan argues that 
it is “within the context of a national culture that the core liberal values of individual autonomy 
and self-identity, social justice, and democracy are best realized.”23 States, thus, are useful in that 
they demarcate and preserve cultural identities and value systems that promote well-being.  
Furthermore, states are uniquely able to understand the culture-specific needs of their citizens, 
and create domestic structures accordingly.  This is important because it helps promote 
reasonable pluralism in the international contract.  Pogge contends that "attaining a world of 
peace and justice requires widespread acceptance of international pluralism."
24
 The use of states 
as actors is essential to maintaining this reasonable pluralism, because it creates units of 
autonomy within the international cooperative scheme.  A world state, for instance, cannot 
accommodate the same level of reasonable pluralism insofar as it would, as an international 
contract does, have only one set of rules and codes at any given time.  Its unity is its weakness: 
without room for variation, there is no room for pluralism.  The use of states solves this problem, 
because each state can, within the limits of reasonable pluralism, as discussed later, allow for 
variety of cultural ideas, norms, etiquettes, and other values.  While institutions of international 
justice may distribute sovereignty vertically, the basic unit of states remains.  In other words, the 
ultimate structure for regulating the global basic structure would more closely resemble the 
European Union—wherein individual sovereign states act in coordinated patterns to ensure 
mutual benefit—than the United States—wherein states are not truly sovereign and are governed 
by a large federal government.  The value of states is in their specific abilities and knowledge 
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regarding their specific populations.  Diffuse sovereignty, then, is important in maintaining the 
value of these institutions. 
Rawlsian liberals are divided over the appropriate actor for an international contract.  
However, they uniformly agree that a world government is not a valuable method for 
international cooperation because “we do not need to entertain communitarian fantasies of 
culturally and normatively perfectly homogeneous political societies in order to realize that in 
political units smaller than the global community it will be easier to find a reasoned consensus on 
more specific principles of justice…than on a global scale.”25 Put another way, "a world 
government…would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by 
frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and 
autonomy.”26 However, while Rawlsian liberals agree that there must be some smaller unit of 
agency than a world government, there is disagreement about what such units ought be.   Most 
liberals from the Rawlsian traditions embrace the use of states as actors.  Rawls himself, 
however, advocates peoples as the actors.  I contend that Rawls’s reliance on peoples instead of 
states is confusing and unnecessary.  Instead, I agree with Hinsch and Buchanan that a liberal 
approach is best served by the use of states as the actors. 
Rawls argues that: 
 The term ‘peoples,’… is meant to emphasize these singular features of peoples as 
distinct from states, as traditionally conceived, and to highlight their moral 
character and the reasonably just, or decent, nature of their regimes.  It is 
significant that peoples’ rights and duties in regard to their so-called sovereignty 
derive from the Law of Peoples itself, to which they would agree along with other 
peoples in suitable circumstances.  As just or decent peoples, the reasons for their 
conduct accord with the corresponding principles.  They are not moved solely by 
their prudent or rational pursuit interests, the so-called reasons of state.
27
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Rawls’s use of ‘peoples’, thus, is meant to emphasize ethical characteristic over the traditionally 
non-moral, Westphalian understandings of states.  Peoples, on the other hand have “a reasonably 
just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests;" are “united 
by…common sympathies;” and have “a moral nature”.28 Buchanan further clarifies this 
distinction: “for Rawls, peoples are groups with their own states.”29 Thus, we can understand 
Rawls’s conception of peoples as moral, united in common sympathies, and contained with and 
fully containing of their own state.   
Yet this distinction in Rawls is unnecessary.  As Buchanan argues, “Rawls courts 
confusion: given that the term ‘people’ is often used to refer to ethnic or national groups, 
including those that lack their own states.”30 In other words, because ‘peoples’ often means 
interstate groups, such as certain Amazonian tribes or the Roma people in Europe, as well as 
groups within a state, such as the Catalan people in Spain, Rawls’s definition is counter-intuitive 
and not helpful.  Rawls makes the distinction between people and state because he wants to hold 
the actors in his Law of Peoples to an ethical standard, to duties and obligations that derive from 
the Law of Peoples.  While this is a noble goal, and, indeed, imperative to any international 
scheme, the use of peoples does not advance this aim.  I agree with Pogge when he argues that he 
“do[es] not believe that the notion of ‘a people’ is clear enough and significant enough in the 
human world to play the conceptual role and to have the moral significance that Rawls assigns to 
it.” 31 The term peoples, then, breeds confusion, not clarity. 
Rawls’s greatest concern with the use of states as the actors is that states are unable to be 
held to ethical standards.  Yet this is not necessary either empirically or philosophically.  
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Empirically, states ratify declarations of human rights, children’s rights, and women’s rights, 
they join together into governance bodies like the United Nations to promote welfare and rights, 
even limitedly, around the world.  Many states even donate some of their wealth to other states in 
need.
32
 These empirical realities demonstrate that states can be moral actors, even in the status 
quo.  Furthermore, there is nothing philosophically inconsistent with holding states to moral 
standards.  States are, as cosmopolitans emphasize, ultimately comprised of and answerable to 
individuals, which can be held to moral standards.  States, being the amalgamations of these 
liberal peoples, can thus be held to moral standards on a theoretical level.  In other words, 
because states are actors comprised of moral agents, they can be held to moral standards.  
Rawls’s insistence on the use of peoples, therefore, is unnecessary.  As Buchanan articulates, this 
insistence is based on an outdated understanding of how state interactions work.  The emphasis 
on peoples is merely “rules for a vanished Westphalian world,” rather than grounded in the 
empirical reality of the world.
33
 
On the question of who ought be the actor in an international cooperation scheme to 
regulate the global basic structure, thus, cosmopolitans and liberal converge: states.  As Beitz, a 
cosmopolitan, contends, “states should count for something in moral reasoning because states are 
the most effective political mechanism for protecting human rights, which are themselves pre-
eminently cosmopolitan values.”34 Thus, states ought to be the actor for constructing and 
understanding a just international cooperation scheme because, given the existing structure that a 
more just system of cooperation would arise from.  Tan expresses this idea when he argues “a 
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truly liberal nationalism…must also be a cosmopolitan nationalism in the sense that it has to 
cohere with the quintessential cosmopolitan principles of normative individualism and ethical 
universalism.”35 Furthermore, because of states’ ability to maintain reasonable pluralism within a 
scheme of international cooperation, they are uniquely valuable.  Rawls’s argument for peoples 
unnecessarily convolutes discourse without providing meaningful distinction from states.  Thus, 
as Hinsch argues, a system of states is preferable to alternatives because they are “internally 
regulated by domestic conceptions of justice…[and] would be able to realize locally a degree of 
positive autonomy…that no system with only global principles of justice could possibly 
achieve.”36 States, therefore, are the best actors for social cooperation. 
 The second question to be asked is what structure would a social international 
cooperative scheme take.  In this, like in actors, I argue that cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals 
should converge. 
 
Structure 
 Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans fundamentally agree on the structure that a scheme 
of international cooperation would take.  Both camps argue that the most successful scheme 
would be modeled on a social contract designing and maintaining the global basic structure.  In 
this sense, they are all Rawlsian, seeking to apply the principles of justice that Rawls articulates 
in A Theory of Justice for the domestic case in some sense to the international community.  The 
value of an international social contract is that it “focuses on the fundamental 'rules of the game'  
and not on what rules players are morally free or constrained to make within a particular game in 
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progress.”37 That is, it is valuable insofar as it does not require absolute justice in every single 
human interaction—an impossible goal—but rather seeks to create a just global basic structure 
upon which just interactions can occur.  As discussed above, without such justice in the 
background conditions, institutions and interactions cannot be fair, and hence not just. 
What would such an international social contract look like? That is, what structure would 
it take? Rawls approaches this question as an extension of his domestic case: “apply the two 
principles to the basic structure of a national society, and then reconvene the parties for a second 
session to deal with the relations among such societies.”38 This reconvening would be done 
through representatives of individual societies behind a veil of ignorance.  Similar to the 
domestic case, representatives of societies “know nothing about the particular circumstances of 
their own society, its power and strength in comparison with other nations, nor do they know 
their place in their own society.”39 This two-fold level of blindness is important.  First, the 
representatives do not know the particulars of their own society.  They do not know if they are 
economic superpowers, or developing nations dependent upon the aid of other states.  They do 
not know if they have vast mineral or oil deposits, seaports, or industrialized power grids.  They 
are ignorant both of the domestic particulars of their own society as well how those particulars 
compare to and relate to the particulars of other societies.  This is important because it creates 
conditions under which, as in the domestic case, considerations of economic inequalities might 
arise.  Second, the representatives of states are unaware of their own place in society.  This is 
important because it incentivizes consideration not just of the elite or ruling class, but of greater 
social considerations in constructing rules of egalitarian social interaction.  Put together, this 
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two-fold veil of ignorance ensures, as Buchanan argues, “parties representing peoples strive to 
ensure that their societies are not disadvantaged by the global basic structure.”40  
One point of disagreement between Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans is what 
considerations delegates in this position would bring to the structure of an international contract.  
Rawls assumes that delegates are uniquely concerned with being a just liberal society, rather than 
with considerations of egalitarianism.
41
 Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, hold that “each 
delegate assumes that her people has an ultimate interest not only in the justice of its domestic 
institutions, but also in the well-being of its members.”42 Put another way, “because the parties in 
the domestic original position are represented as ‘free and equal’, they will avoid principles that 
might turn out to assign them to an inferior status.”43  On this account, representatives of states 
enter into a second, international original position and select principles that promote the well-
being of their citizens and society.  These representatives are concerned not with merely being 
“constituted as a just liberal society,” but also broader egalitarian principles.44 
However, Rawls’s initial rejection of an egalitarian conception of global justice only 
makes sense without an understanding of the global basic structure’s importance.  Modern 
Rawlsian liberals such as Allen Buchanan and Wilfried Hinsch who take the global basic 
structure into account endorse a much more egalitarian structure with broader considerations for 
the international social contract.   Rawls’s insistence that representatives would only be 
interested in a very narrow set of considerations is based on Rawls’s failure to adequately 
appreciate the significance of the global basic structure.  In other words, “Rawls simply assumes 
that it is only ‘the basic structure of their society’ that is relevant to whether a people prospers or 
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not.”45 However, because “like a domestic global structure, the global basic structure in part 
determines the prospects [of states]…It is therefore unjustifiable to ignore the global basic 
structure in a moral theory of international law.”46 Since representatives of states would want to 
ensure that their people have the ability to be liberal, they would necessarily be concerned with 
the global basic structure, because of the effect that it has on domestic opportunities as described 
above.  Thus, a Rawlsian liberal interpretation must consider not merely in maintaining a 
particular conception of domestic justice.  For Rawls, thus, in order for principles to “satisfy the 
criterion of reciprocity, since this criterion holds at both [the domestic and international] levels,” 
broader egalitarian concerns must be considered.
47
  Thus, the structure of a global moral order 
would include egalitarian considerations. 
 Thus, cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals should converge, given the importance of the 
global basic structure.  The structure of global cooperation takes representatives of states, who 
neither know their own position in society, nor their society’s position in relation to other 
societies, who are concerned with both their state’s ability to address fundamental questions of 
domestic justice, and also considerations of economic equality between states, given the 
pervasive influence of the global basic structures.  The principles of social cooperation, 
therefore, derive from this basis, and must reflect both concerns for preserving state conceptions 
of justice and broader inter-state concerns of social and economic justice. 
 
General Principles 
 Thus far, I have demonstrated that, given the existence and importance of the global basic 
structure, cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian liberalism have the capacity to incorporate an 
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understanding of the reality of our interconnected world, and accept the implications of this 
pervasive global basic structure on a system of global justice as fairness.  Further, I have 
demonstrated that both cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals should prefer a social contract 
between representatives of states in an original position in order to promote rights and wellbeing 
while still pragmatically promoting reasonable pluralism.  The next question, thus, is what 
general principles would derive from such a structure.  In this section, I explore the general 
principles, arguing that cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals would agree to principles of 
distributive justice given the existence of the global basic structure.  In the next chapter, I explore 
these general principles in more detail, explaining several more pragmatic implications of the 
general, ideal theory I put forth here. 
In determining principles of a cooperative international scheme, justice must be at the 
forefront.  Inequalities must be justifiable and reasonable based on principles of justice.  Put 
another way, “we [Americans]…need to justify to a Mexican why we should be entitled to life 
prospects that are so much superior to hers merely because we were born on the other side of 
some line—a difference that, on the face of it, is not less morally arbitrary than differences in 
sex, in skin color, or in the affluence of one’s parents.”48  
There are three primary questions in determining what broad principles would promote 
global justice at the intersection of Rawlsian liberal and cosmopolitan views: 
1.) What are the principles of membership? 
2.) What are the principles that limit state actions? 
3.) What are the principles that guide resource distribution?  
The first question asks if only liberal states, in the Rawlsian sense, can be included, or if other 
types of states such as decent hierarchical, outlaw, or burdened may or even must be included.  
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The second question asks about the limits of reasonable pluralism in a system of global justice 
and determines the role of human rights in international justice.  The third question asks what 
obligations of distribution and resource management global justice requires, that is, whether vast 
economic or social inequalities can be tolerated, and to what extent, in a just global contract. 
 
Principles of Membership 
The first question is: what principles of membership limit or expand the bounds of global 
justice? What types of states ought, or must be included? I accept Rawls’s categories of states: 
liberal, decent, burdened, outlaw, and benevolent absolutisms.  Though for Rawls both ‘liberal’ 
and ‘decent’ are properly attributed to peoples not states, I, for the reasons articulated above, 
apply these labels to states.  A liberal state, like a liberal people, has legitimate liberal 
constitutions, common sympathies, and moral nature.
49
 It is clear from a cosmopolitan 
perspective that burdened societies ought be included.  Further, I argue that once a Rawlsian 
liberal account considers the global basic structure, it must likewise naturally include burdened 
states within the international contract. 
A cosmopolitan’s purpose for including burdened states in the international structure of 
justice is clear: if individuals are the units of moral worth, then the fact than they are born in 
burdened societies rather than liberal or decent ones is irrelevant to our egalitarian duties to 
them.  The international social contract must include them, therefore, because of the nature of the 
egalitarian duties that the contract seeks to protect.  Moreover, if an international original 
position is to encompass human rights, it must, by necessity, be universal.  As Bietz explains, 
“the exclusion of outlaw (and other) societies from the international original position means that 
no argument for human rights, made from the point of view of the original position, could 
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establish that human rights have the kind of universality that is usually presumed.”50 In other 
words, in order for the rights articulated by the international contract to be universal, 
membership in the contract must likewise be universal.  Because cosmopolitans care about the 
rights and welfare of every individual, cosmopolitans hold that concern for the subjects of non-
liberal peoples necessitates their inclusion in the international social contract.  This means that 
non-liberal peoples must be included.   Thirdly, given that the global basic structure affects all 
societies, a system of international justice that regulates it must consider and take into account all 
affected parties, including and even particularly burdened societies who most directly suffer as a 
result of any injustices and inequalities in the global basic structure.   
This last point is also key for a Rawlsian perspective.  I argue that a Rawlsian liberal 
account must include not only liberal and decent societies, but also burdened states, outlaw 
states, and benevolent absolutisms because of the global basic structure.  Rawls explicitly 
advocates a minimal duty to aid for burdened states, with the aim of bringing burdened societies 
into the international community more fully.
51
 This implies that Rawls should want burdened 
societies included in the international contract, because the best chance of promoting human 
rights and political justice and stability can occur within the context of the international 
contract’s regulatory powers.  Similarly, Rawlsian liberals should advocate that outlaw states 
ought not be tolerated in their outlaw form, and be forced towards liberal or at least decent 
structures in order to be included.
52
 Because Rawlsian liberals are concerned with the integrity of 
the state, they should include non-liberal states.  Thus, like cosmopolitans, Rawlsian liberals 
ought advocate a broad understanding of what kinds of states ought be members of an 
international contract. 
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Furthermore, from an original position, representatives of outlaw and other nonliberal 
states would not know the structure of their society, and thus would not know they were 
nonliberal.  Given this limitations, representatives of all states would want to be included within 
the international contract, because of the pervasive power of the global basic structure.  In other 
words, because the global basic structure has such a pervasive influence on a domestic society’s 
economic, social, and political opportunities, it is in the best interest of all states to participate in 
order to promote their own state interest.  In self-interest, then, nonliberal states would seek to be 
included in the global basic structure.  
Moreover, it is structurally possible to include non-liberal peoples in the international 
contract, because, as Buchanan explains: 
Regardless of whether one represents a people whose internal conception of 
justice is egalitarian or hierarchical, one’s commitment to protecting both the 
capacity of one’s society to implement its conception of justice and one’s 
commitment to securing equal status in the international community for one’s 
society require the choice of principles of justice for the global basic structure.
53
 
 
In other words, because all states want to advance themselves and their interests, they 
need not be liberal in order to choose just principles in guiding their interactions with other 
states.  Thus, “representatives of inegalitarian societies would choose principles for the law of 
peoples that express the equality of peoples.”54 It is thus structurally possible, as well as 
philosophically necessary, to include nonliberal peoples in an international contract of global 
justice. 
However, it is important to note that not all states need be included in regulatory and 
governing institutions of international justice simply because they are part of the original social 
contract.  While outlaw states and illiberal states have incentives to participate in the original 
                                                     
53
 Buchanan 2000 709 
54
 Bietz 2000 712 
Fetrow 60 
position and to craft just policies, these incentives are premised upon their position behind the 
veil of ignorance. Illiberal and outlaw states are not appropriate actors for designing the 
institutions that realize the principles of global justice outside of the original position. Certain 
limits, thus, may be imposed on standing as full and equal members of the international 
community that require that outlaw states and illiberal states liberalize and accept certain norms, 
such as human rights, in order to participate fully. These limits also regulate and restrict the 
actions of states of all types may take against their own people. Below, I explore what these 
limits might entail. 
 
Principles of Limits 
Of course, including such a variety of types of states who have differing conceptions of 
human rights, or perhaps do not even acknowledge human rights, raises questions for reasonable 
pluralism.  Thus, the second question in determining the principles that derive from an 
international social contract is: What are the limits of reasonable pluralism in a system of global 
justice? I contend that both cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals would agree that reasonable 
pluralism within the bounds of human rights must be not only tolerated, but accepted and even 
encouraged. 
Rawls argues that “reasonable pluralism is not to be regretted…[because] given the 
socially feasible alternatives, the existence of pluralism allows a society of greater political 
justice and liberty.”55 Reasonable pluralism allows for societies to pursue different conceptions 
of justice within their societies, while agreeing to principles of justice that guide their 
international cooperation.   As Rawls argues, “the existence of pluralism allows a society of 
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greater political justice and liberty.”56 Importantly, however, the doctrines allowed by a 
reasonable pluralism must be such that each must still see the others as viable and sensible 
alternatives to their own perspectives.
57
 Pluralism, thus, is central to a Rawlsian account. 
Cosmopolitans, too, embrace reasonable pluralism in an international contract.  Pogge 
argues that “institutional moral cosmopolitanism is committed to the freedom of individual 
persons and therefore envisions a pluralist global order.”58  In other words, because 
cosmopolitans embrace the individual as the ultimate moral unit, and pluralism is the result of 
free choices of individuals and the communities they create, a system of international justice 
must allow for reasonable pluralism. 
However, both accounts agree that human rights “set limit to the pluralism among 
peoples."
59
 Pogge holds that:  
We should conceive human rights primarily as claims on coercive social 
institutions and secondarily as claims against those who uphold such institutions.  
Such an institutional understanding goes beyond an interactional one, which 
presents human rights as placing the treatment of human of human beings under 
certain constraints that do not presuppose the existence of social institutions.
60
   
 
Like the distinction between interaction and institutional cosmopolitanism
61
, this conception of 
human rights emphasizes the relation of institutions to rights, rather than specific, individual 
actions.   Put another way, “human rights are primarily supposed to govern how all of us together 
ought to design the basic rules of our common life.”62 They are central to the cosmopolitan 
account of global justice because they protect the individuals that are at the heart of the 
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cosmopolitan account.  Pogge subscribes to a broad account of human rights such as outlined in 
the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.63 This includes “secure access to 
minimally adequate shares of basic freedoms and participation, of food, drink, clothing, shelter, 
education, and health care.”64 Human rights therefore provide limits to pluralism insofar as 
pluralism is only ‘reasonable’ and therefore allowable when it is within the confines of human 
rights.  This is a narrow interpretation of pluralism but, as Pogge contends, human rights must be 
the ultimate goal.  Pluralism is a value in that it helps advance that goal.  When it is instead in 
opposition to human rights, pluralism, not rights, must be set aside. 
 Human rights are also central to a Rawlsian liberal account.  However, in contrast to the 
expansive cosmopolitan view of rights, Rawls’s view of rights is restricted to “a special class of 
urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of 
conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”65 This is importantly 
different from a cosmopolitan account because of the notable absence of any mention of 
economic or social rights.  However, simply because the definition of human rights is narrower 
does not mean that the Rawlsian account values them any less.  Rawls writes that fulfillment of 
human rights “is a necessary condition of the decency of a society’s political institutions and of 
its legal order.”66 Because Rawls’s definition of human rights is narrow, therefore, the Rawlsian 
approach to the constraints on reasonable pluralism is very different than the cosmopolitan 
approach. 
 However, Rawls’s minimal approach to human rights exists without consideration of the 
global basic structure.  If there were no global basic structure, this narrowness would make 
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sense: if the international structure has no influence over economic or social circumstance, then 
requiring the international contract’s structure to account for social and economic rights is both 
impossible and fruitless.  However, the global basic structure does exist, and it does have serious 
and lasting consequences on social and economic orders.  Because of this, representatives of 
states in the international social contract would want to consider their society’s economic and 
social abilities and opportunities.  They would want to ensure their access to these things by 
articulating broader rights than the ones that Rawls explicitly mentions, even if that meant 
limiting their rights to pluralism.  In other words, the global basic structure has a profound 
impact on the opportunities and abilities of domestic societies, both directly and by influencing 
the domestic basic structure.
67
 Because of this, the rights that representatives would articulate in 
an international original position on a Rawlsian liberal account would converge with 
cosmopolitan account of rights: broader, more inclusive, and more egalitarian.  Reasonable 
pluralism, therefore, is limited by egalitarian rights that include social and economic rights, in 
addition to Rawls’s class of ‘urgent’ rights. 
While the specific content of a doctrine of human rights is beyond my scope, the 
framework for evaluating whether a claim constitutes a right derives from the international 
original position.  Charles Beitz compellingly proposes that human rights would be the result of 
an overlapping consensus whose boundaries are set not by “the philosophical or moral beliefs 
that actually prevail in the world’s major cultures…but rather by the best available elaboration of 
the basic normative materials of these cultures for the circumstances of modern life.”68 In other 
words, the consensus that forms the foundation for a doctrine of human rights is premised upon 
hypothetical agreement, not actual agreement.  Though Beitz does not make this point explicitly, 
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the implication of this is that a doctrine of human rights must derive from the international 
original position.  Therefore, in the original position, human rights claims are to be considered 
according to the three principles described above.   
 Again, it is beyond my scope here to consider in too great of depth what claims could 
properly be considered ‘rights’.  However, I want to indicate a preliminary discussion of what 
types of claims might be included.  Beitz advances one schema that is valuable for this purpose.  
He proposes that a justified claim for human rights would have three parts: 
1. That the interest that would be protected by the right is sufficiently important 
when reasonably regarded from the perspective of those protected that it 
would be reasonable to consider its protection to be a priority. 
2. That it would be advantageous to protect the underlying interest by means of 
legal or policy instruments available to the state. 
3. That in the central range of cases in which a state might fail to provide the 
protection, the failure would be a suitable object of international concern.
69
 
 
The first principle serves to demonstrate that the claim, when deprived, constitutes a negative 
impact on one’s life.  This can occur in a number of ways.  The claim may be, for instance, 
“sufficiently generic that it would be reasonable to expect anyone to recognize their importance 
(e.g.  the interests in physical security and adequate nutrition).”70 Interesting, these rights are 
prior to Rawls’s urgent rights.  Bodily integrity, preserved by access to nutrition and physical 
security, is a necessary precondition to liberty of conscious or freedom from serfdom.  While 
Rawls’s claim that the security of minority groups from genocide is an urgent right, it is merely 
an aspect of a broader conception of a right to physical safety.  Put another way, human rights 
must be universal, and, as such, a right to physical security cannot just apply to minority groups, 
but must apply to all individuals.  Other forms of human rights, Beitz contends, are abstracted to 
a level where (nearly) everyone would agree to them, such as freedom to follow one’s religion, 
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or derived from other interests, such as a right to vote may be derived from a right to political 
participation.
71
 The common feature that underlies these different justifications for human rights 
is “that the importance of the interest, seen from the standpoint of the reasonable beneficiary, 
should be intelligible to reasonable persons who might be called upon to protect it.”72 This 
conception of human rights, so understood, is best articulated and justified in the international 
original position, because it requires that a rights claim be intelligible without reference to self-
interest.   
 There is much disagreement about the content of a doctrine of human rights.  While 
some, like Pogge, advocate a very broad interpretation of human rights akin to those delineated 
in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, this expansive conception is widely 
disputed.  However, as long as we accept that there ought be at least some conception of human 
rights, it seems quite clear that the most foundational necessities to human existence would be 
protected under this conception of human rights.  Adequate food, water, healthcare, or shelter is 
a precursor to what might be considered ‘higher-level’ rights.  Put another way, I cannot 
meaningfully pursue my religion, participate in the political process, or pursue my conception of 
the good life if I am fully occupied by trying to survive. As Henry Shue argues, “No one can 
fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if he or she lacks the 
essentials for a reasonably healthy and active life.”73 What higher-level rights might also be 
included in a doctrine of human rights established by the international original position I set 
aside here, suffice to say that if a claim is to be considered a right, it must satisfy the criteria here 
established.  That is, a right must be recognized as such by participants in the international social 
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contract.  Furthermore, as any claim of ‘right’ is considered, its corollary effect on pluralism 
must likewise be considered.  These two considerations, taken together, provide the limits both 
for each other and for global justice. 
  
Principles of Distribution 
The final structural question asks what obligations of distribution and resource 
management global justice requires, that is, whether vast economic or social inequalities can be 
tolerated, and to what extent, in a just global contract.  I call this question a question of principles 
of distribution.   There are two potential broad principles of distribution that I will consider in 
contrasting Rawlsian and cosmopolitan accounts of global justice: a minimal standard akin to 
Rawls’s duty of assistance or the broader standard of Rawls’s domestic difference principle.74 
Cosmopolitans embrace the second approach.  I argue that, though Rawls explicitly embraces the 
first approach, Rawlsian liberalism must embrace the second approach when the global basic 
structure is taken into account.   Given the centrality of the global basic structure, and the 
implications of the global basic structure on understandings of human rights, it is clear that there 
must be substantial principles of economic aid and distributive shares in some sense.  Because a 
global basic structure results in economic advantages to some states and disadvantages to others, 
a just structure must distribute inequalities justly.   
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In the domestic case, Rawls argues compellingly for a democratic interpretation of justice 
that “is arrived at by combining the principle of fair equality of opportunity with the difference 
principle…The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more 
attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less 
fortunate.”75  In other words, in the domestic case, Rawls advocates the combination of fair 
equality of opportunity, which holds that “each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”76 Thus, a basic structure 
must be such that all persons have access to basic liberties, which, according to Rawls, include 
“rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth.”77 Yet Rawls acknowledges 
that this is not sufficient, by itself, to ensure a justice society. After all, we are all born subject to 
natural and social lotteries, which have implications for our outcomes. For example, if I am born 
with a low IQ, or handicapped, my potential is different from someone not so afflicted. 
Similarly, if I am born to a wealthy family able to afford to send me to the best schools, I am 
better situated than if I am born to a poor family who cannot afford these advantages. Rawls 
argues that these lotteries are equally arbitrary. That is, I can no more help the social situation to 
which I am born than I can help my natural features. Thus, if I accept that unequal, or at least 
dissimilar, results based on one type of lottery are unjust, I must equally accept that the other is 
unjust. In other words, if I accept that different life prospects based on immutable characteristics 
like race or  gender are unjust, I must similarly accept that different life prospects based on 
familial wealth are unjust, and vice versa.
78
 Thus, Rawls holds in the domestic case that “it 
seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place in 
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the distribution of native endowments, any more than one deserves one’s initial stating place in 
society.”79 
The difference principle follows from this because it constructs a society wherein “gains 
are not made at others’ expense...”80 In other words, the difference principle serves to mitigate 
the injustices of the natural and social lottery because “those who have been favored by 
nature…may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who 
have lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted…”81 
Thus, within the context of the domestic sphere, sheer luck is not a justified or justifiable reason 
to allow for inequalities. 
Rawls’s emphasis on regulating the social structure in order to advance a society that is 
not only efficient but also just leads to his  rejection a system of natural liberty. He argues: 
In the system of natural liberty the distribution is regulated by the arrangements 
implicit in the conception of careers open to talents. These arrangements 
presuppose a background of equal liberty….They require a formal equality of 
opportunity in that all have at least the same level rights of access to all 
advantaged social positions. But since there is no effort to preserve an equality, or 
similarity, of social conditions, except insofar as this is necessary to preserve the 
requisite background institutions, the initial distribution of assets for any period of 
time is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies…the most obvious 
injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be 
improperly influenced by…factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view.82  
 
Importantly, in this conception Rawls emphasizes that it is the basic structure—society’s 
influence on the individual’s choices—that render the system of natural liberty unjust. In other 
words, what makes this potential system unfair is that it does not account for the influence that 
society has on one’s choices. Therefore, one’s options and potentials are not entirely one’s own, 
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they are shaped and limited by the basic structure. Regulation of the basic structure in the form 
of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle is therefore necessary. 
Central to Rawls’s domestic theory, therefore, is that: 
The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make 
the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends 
in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can 
claim no credit….Thus the more advantaged representative man cannot say that 
he deserves and therefore has a right to a scheme of cooperation in which he is 
permitted to acquire benefits in ways that do not contribute to the welfare of 
others…From the standpoint of common sense, then, the difference principle 
appears to be acceptable both to the more advantaged and to the less advantaged 
individual.
83
  
  
Rawls’s defense of the difference principle, which maximizes the distributive share of the least 
well-off, is one of the most important and influential elements of his theory of (domestic) justice.  
However, Rawls explicitly rejects the difference principle in the international case in 
favor of a minimal standard he calls the duty of assistance.  He holds that “the levels of wealth 
and welfare among societies may vary, and presumably do so; but adjusting those levels is not 
the object of the duty of assistance.  Only burdened societies need help.”84 In other words, the 
only requirement in a just international social contract is minimal duties to burdened societies to 
allow them to establish a liberal or decent political culture.  He believes that "political culture of 
a burdened society is all-important,” and that is disassociated from economic prosperity.85 
Because political culture is the only “crucial element in how a country fares…and not the level 
of its resources, the arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources causes no difficulty.”86 
Beitz expands on this idea, arguing that, because “the parties to the international original position 
would know that natural resources are distributed unevenly over the Earth’s surface…the parties 
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would view the distribution of resources much as Rawls says the parties to the domestic original 
position…view the distribution of natural talents.”87 Thus, Rawls concludes, the distributive 
principles chosen by the representatives in the international original position would be the 
minimalistic duty to assist burdened societies, rather than more egalitarian duties. 
However, even if it were true that a society could be liberal, successful, and just with 
essentially no resources, the fact that the people within that society are poorer, and thus have 
fewer opportunities, less access to healthcare, adequate nutrition, clean water, or education 
renders such inequalities unjust.  Moreover, if these inequalities derive from an unjust global 
basic structure, differences in outcomes are not Rawls claims, ‘arbitrary’.  Rather, it is the result 
of systematic injustices in the international system.  Whether a state has access to resources or 
not is not the only nor even the main reason for a country’s economic success.  This has been 
demonstrated through research in fields such as economic development literature and resource 
curse theory.
88
 Wealth and income are important in assuring welfare and access to political, 
economic, and social opportunities.  As Hinsch explains, “income and wealth are all-purpose 
means that have instrumental value for individuals irrespective of their more comprehensive 
conceptions of life in all sorts of social environments.”89 In other words, without access to a 
certain amount of economic resources, none of the rights that Rawlsian liberalism wants to 
protect can be preserved or promoted.  Put another way:  
Being well-governed does not ensure that a society will be able to provide a 
decent and worthwhile life for all members nor that its distinctive conception of 
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justice or the good can be adequately implemented.  A well-governed society 
might be seriously disadvantaged by the global basic structure…90 
 
Thus, economic considerations and justice must be considered not only to promote political 
justice, but also intrinsically because of the effects that the global basic structure has on 
economic opportunities, or the lack thereof, of some states.  Moreover, because as Rawls himself 
admits, human rights include “the means of subsistence.”91 Because the global basic structure 
can have a negative impact on these means of subsistence, it must therefore regulate it not only 
in cases of burdened societies, but wherever it causes injustices. 
 Note that in the domestic case Rawls calls it “fixed” that the particular circumstances of 
one’s family is insufficient justification for rejecting the difference principle.92 Yet as I have 
already argued, the state into which one is born is just as important as one’s family. If I am 
female born into a culture which does not allow women to attend school, my options are limited 
by that society. If I am born into a state wherein I do not have access to healthcare, clean water, 
or a secure food supply, my options are incredibly affected. Just as in the domestic case one’s 
family is both morally arbitrary and incredibly influential to one’s opportunities for success, so 
too is one’s state. For Rawls to ignore the centrality of the state in determining one’s outcomes 
grievously undermines his account of international justice, because it treats kinds that are alike in 
this regard—states and families—as unlike. This comparison between states and families 
provides further reason for Rawls’s difference principle to be applied on the international level in 
order for his theories of justice to be internally consistent. 
In defense of his minimalist duty of assistance, Rawls gives two cases that he believes 
demonstrate that a more egalitarian distributive principle would be unjust.  The first is of two 
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countries of equal wealth, one of which industrializes and prospers, the other which does not.
93
 
According to Rawls, asking the country that succeeded to continually flow taxes to the less 
successful country is “unacceptable.”94  Similarly, if a country provides “elements of equal 
justice for women” and benefits as a result, and another does not, the first should not be required 
to aid the second.
95
 
The problem with these examples is that they presume that states operate in a vacuum, 
that their successes are entirely determined by their own actions.  However, given the global 
basic structure, this is untrue.  The industrial society’s ability to sell its produce, for example, is 
dependent upon the international community being willing to purchase its products, or upon parts 
and equipment produced in other countries being available.  At a very basic level, then, a state’s 
economic success is not the result of simply its own efforts, but dependent upon the global basic 
structure. 
Moreover, as Barry points out, “there is no country that is well off by world 
standards…in which the current generation can claim all the credit for their prosperity.”96  In 
other words, “saying ‘we deserve it because we worked for it’ is never strictly true, unless the 
‘we’ is tacitly extended back to earlier generations.”97 Thus, even if Rawls is correct that the 
success of these states is uniquely dependent upon their domestic policies, the particular 
individuals who institute a policy are typically not those who reap the benefits.   Similarly, a 
country that is not well-off (the second countries in each of Rawls’s scenarios) is poorly off not 
only through its own actions, but the construct of the global basic structure.   
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Rawls’s reasons for advocating a minimal principle of distribution, therefore, are 
rendered unreasonable given the existence of a global basic structure.  Rawls’s failure to include 
egalitarian distributive principles is based on the fact that he ignores the global basic structure.  
The alternative is that which Rawls himself proposes in the domestic case: the broader standard 
of distributive obligations that Rawls calls the difference principle.  Indeed, Rawlsian liberals 
who accept and embrace the global basic structure similarly embrace principles of justice akin to 
Rawls’s domestic case.  For example, Barry argues, “if Rawls’s arguments for the difference 
principle…are valid at all, then it would seem that we can argue immediately that they should be 
applied globally.”98 Thus, the global basic structure, like the domestic basic structure, has the 
potential to: 
(1) [fail] to give members of different peoples roughly equal chances to influence 
the transnational political decisions that shape their lives.  (2) …[fail] to give [the] 
equally talented and motivated … roughly equal chances … (3) [and generate] 
international social and economic inequalities that are not to the maximum benefit 
of the world’s worst-off...99  
 
In other words, because the global basic structure has the power to create economic inequalities 
analogous to the inequalities caused by the basic structure in the domestic case, Rawlsian liberal 
must embrace egalitarian principles of distribution like the difference principle that they embrace 
in the domestic case both in order to be consistent with their own philosophical stance, and also 
to have a chance of achieving the aims of their political theory, which are, as Rawls holds, to 
extend justice as fairness to international law.
100
 Therefore, as Pogge argues, “Those who are 
really committed to a liberal conception of justice will envision a law of peoples which demands 
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that persons everywhere enjoy the protection of the full list of human rights as well as adequate 
opportunities and material means that are not radically unequal.”101  
 Rawlsian liberal advocacy of egalitarian principles of distribution further makes sense 
given the discussion of liberal human rights I discuss above.   Recall that, given the influence of 
the global basic structure, representatives of states would choose principles of rights that 
consider their society’s economic status comparative to other states.  Thus, the conception of 
human rights that would be articulated by the representatives of states in the international 
original position necessitates egalitarian principles of redistribution.  In other words, because 
representatives behind the veil of ignorance would not know if their society would be greatly 
advantaged or disadvantaged economically by the original position, they would select principles 
of distribution that would protect the least well-off states in order to promote their own society’s 
economic status.   
 Cosmopolitans naturally embrace these broader egalitarian principles of distribution.  
Because cosmopolitans value the welfare of the individual, massive economic inequalities, and 
the suffering that arises from them, are unacceptable.  Put another way, the centrality of the 
concern for welfare and human rights in a cosmopolitan account means that dramatic economic 
inequalities that derive from and are sustained by the global basic structure which cosmopolitans 
(and Rawlsian liberals) seek to regulate means that the principle of distribution that would derive 
from an international social contract would be broad egalitarian principles, rather than narrow 
principles.   
Interestingly, the difference principle can also be reached through a libertarian 
perspective, even though libertarians like Nozick actively and emphatically reject it.  Nozick’s 
own theory can create a difference principle through Nozick’s use of the Lockean proviso.  
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According to Locke, appropriation of raw materials is acceptable when “enough and as good” is 
left for others.
102
 In other words, principles of distribution are just when they are “consistent with 
the equality of other individuals,” and do not make them worse-off.103  Nozick offers an 
interpretation of the Lockean proviso that creates limits on actions as limiting others’ rights.  
According to Nozick, to worsen the condition of others has two features.  First, he “defines 
‘worse-off’ in terms of material welfare…[second] it defines pre-appropriation common usage as 
the standard of comparison.
104
 However, as Kymlicka points out, Nozick compares only two 
possibilities: a Lockean state of nature, and a libertarian capitalism where one may sell their 
labor or starve.  But “these are not the only two options that are relevant to judgments about the 
legitimacy of appropriation.  It is absurd to say that a person who starves to death is not made 
worse off by Nozick’s system of appropriation when there are other systems in which that person 
would not have died.”105 Nozick, therefore, must deal with these possibilities, and compare a 
libertarian model of just appropriations to other alternatives, not merely to a state of nature.  Yet, 
as Kymlicka notes, even though everyone might be better off in a different scheme, not everyone 
can be entitled to a world “maximally adapted to their best interest.”106 Therefore, a middle 
ground must be achieved that benefits all.  John Arthur argues that the only distribution that 
makes sense, given this proviso, then, is that each person “is as entitled to the resources as 
anybody else.”107 Therefore, any inequalities in the system that must seek to promote this equal 
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entitlement, and therefore any inequalities must go to the benefit of the least well-off.
108
 Given 
the Lockean proviso, therefore, the difference principle is derivable even from a libertarian 
perspective.  This is significant because it demonstrates that the convergence of Rawlsian liberal 
and cosmopolitan approaches on the difference principle is not the only way to derive this 
principle.  The fact that the primary opponent of my proposal within the framework of justice 
could also derive the principles I propose here further indicates that the converge that I 
demonstrate is a reasonable and, indeed, necessary extension of the role and scope of justice. 
How the principles I describe would manifest varies slightly between theorists, but the 
core principle of broad egalitarian distribution remains the same.  For example, Pogge calls for a 
global resource tax that taxes consumption and uses the funds raised to aid those least well-off.
109
 
Similarly, Beitz calls for distributive justice and duties of assistance to ensure reciprocity.
110
 
Barry contends that individuals in a global original position would choose principles that include 
equal rights to natural resources, taxes on resource extraction, and international income tax on 
gross domestic product.
111
 Despite these differences in application, the general principle of 
egalitarian distributive principles remains unchanged.  The reasons for variations of application 
are primarily empirical.  Cosmopolitans agree that the application of these general principles 
must be pragmatic.  As Barry notes, “a transfer which increases resources (either of an individual 
or a collectivity) but which does not relieve suffering of some person or persons has not achieved 
its end.”112  Thus, the variations between cosmopolitan accounts of global justice reflect 
empirical disagreements, rather than theoretical ones.  Moreover, these empirical differences 
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make sense in the context of a rapidly changing world.  Barry, writing in 1980, would naturally 
have different recommendations than would Pogge writing in 2008, as nearly thirty years had 
elapsed between the two writings.  On the general principles, however, cosmopolitans agree. 
 Thus, cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals should converge on the principles of 
distribution that would derive from an international social contract of representatives of states.  
Once the importance of the global basic structure is considered, the Rawlsian adherence to a 
minimal distributive scheme crumbles, and Rawlsian liberals should converge on a global 
difference principle. 
 
Conclusion 
 The global basic structure’s profound and broad-reaching impact on both domestic basic 
structures and the access of societies to opportunities and advancement has implications for the 
supposed tensions and conflicts between cosmopolitanism and liberalism.  In addition, it renders 
inapplicable libertarianism for a scheme of international justice because libertarianism cannot 
account for the global basic structure.   
 Though cosmopolitans and Rawlsian liberals approach the question of global justice from 
different perspectives, they ultimately converge on the actors, structure, and even principles of 
global justice.   As Tan puts it, “once the goals and content of cosmopolitanism global justice, on 
the one hand, and the parameters of liberal nationalism, on the other, are properly defined  and 
identified, the perceived conflict between [liberalism]…and cosmopolitanism disappears.”113  
Thus, an account of global justice that is cognizant of the influence and scope of the global basic 
structure would consist of representatives of states who, in an international original position, 
select broad principles of membership, human rights, and distribution for the international order. 
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Chapter 4: Towards a Realistic Utopia: Implications and Results 
 
 
 I have advanced an account of global justice in the context of cosmopolitan and Rawlsian 
liberal frameworks that considers both theoretical understandings of the actors, structures, and 
principles that would derive from an international social contract as well as the empirical realities 
of our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world.   However, even within the 
contractarian framework through which I work, my approach is not without objections.  At the 
heart of the objections I propose here is the question of whether the approach I advocate 
advances a truly realistic utopia.   This is at the heart of a Rawlsian approach, for in The Law of 
Peoples, Rawls “begin[s] and end[s] with the idea of a realistic utopia.”1 This questions 
manifests in two primary objections: 
1.) Is implementation of the principles I have proposed here possible? 
2.) Are the principles that I propose sustainable?  
The implementation objection argues that the principles of international justice articulated here 
would never be achieved, because the empirical reality of power in the world would never allow 
for distributive justice or principles of cooperation that benefited the least well-off.  The 
sustainability objection holds that the principles argued for here, even if implemented, would 
result in unacceptable or impractical outcomes and would collapse in on themselves. 
 A second type of objection rejects the centrality of the global basic structure. This 
objection, called the interconnectivity objection, holds that despite increasing connectedness, the 
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world is still not so interconnected that parallels may be drawn between the domestic basic 
structure, which clearly influences people’s potential outcomes, and the global basic structure. 
 
The Implementation Objection 
 The implementation objection goes as follows: given the power structure in the status 
quo, wealthy states would never allow the scheme of international justice I propose here to be 
implemented.  Thus, my proposal is insufficient to create a realistic utopia, and the principles I 
argue for are non-Rawlsian, because Rawls emphasizes the value of a realistic utopia.   As I 
demonstrate below, this argument is flawed because it is unduly pessimistic about the trajectory 
of international relations. 
 Central to Rawls’s political philosophy is that he seeks to describe and advocate a 
realistic utopia.  According to Rawls: 
Political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily 
thought of as the limits of practical political possibility.  Our hope for the future 
of our society rests on the belief that the nature of the social world allows 
reasonably just constitutional democratic societies existing as members of the 
Society of Peoples…The idea of this society is realistically utopian in that it 
depicts an achievable social world that combines political right and justice for 
all.
2
 
 
In other words, a political philosophy may be considered realistic if it does not require actions or 
institutions that go beyond what would be considered reasonable and rational to just 
constitutional democratic societies.  This view is deeply tied to the conception of political 
liberalism.  Political liberalism is: 
A form of liberalism that assumes (reasonable) pluralism of moral, philosophical 
and religious views, and which seeks general agreement among citizens on a 
liberal political conception of justice that can serve as a public basis of 
justification among them.  It is Rawls’s attempt in his later works to show that a 
just society is realistically possible in which reasonable citizens all accept a liberal 
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conception of justice on the basis of moral values implicit in democratic culture, 
even though they affirm many different ‘comprehensive’ doctrines.3 
 
In other words, political liberalism attempts to reach agreement between different conceptions 
and approaches, limited by reasonable pluralism and human rights, rather than attempting to 
impose a world view on participants.  Both Rawlsian liberalism and cosmopolitanism are 
branches of political liberalism.  According to Rawls, this approach is most likely to be 
implemented and achieve its goals, because it appeals to reality.  Political liberalism, thus, “does 
not assume the validity of individualist views of the good life…the idea is that…the individualist 
treatment of persons as separate from the substantial ideas they may share with others.”4  
 In the context of political liberalism, an international social contract such as I have 
proposed here is realistic if can be “regarded as an achievable ideal given the permanent 
conditions of human nature, including burdens of judgment.”5 If my proposal does not achieve 
this, then it is not a proposal towards a realistic utopia, and thus cannot be consistent with the 
goals of Rawlsianism or cosmopolitanism.  Thus, the primary objection to my proposal is that it 
is not consistent with a realistic utopia. 
 The first form of the implementation argument is that wealthy states would never agree to 
terms that disfavor them more than the existing global basic structure does, even if these terms 
are generally more just.   An objector in this vein would argue that wealthy states, who hold 
power in the status quo, would never accept the idea that they must distribute their resources or 
the benefits they reap from the global basic structure to worse-off countries.  Furthermore, this 
objection posits that it is impossible to successfully and meaningfully challenge the power of 
state sovereignty, and, insofar as my proposal requires international institutions to enforce global 
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justice, the state would be undermined by my proposal.  Therefore, the wealthy and powerful 
states that are benefited by the unjust status quo would never accept a policy, even a just one, 
that in implementation resulted in a net harm to them.  On this account, the very existence of the 
unjust global basic structure demonstrates that there is no political willpower to modify the 
power of wealthy states or the high standards of living in wealthy states so that other states’ 
situations may improve.  States pursue policies of self-interest, even when doing so massively 
violates the rights of others.  Consider, for example, wars of aggression such as the invasion of 
Europe by Germany in World War II, or colonization, which directly prioritized the rights of 
wealthy European states over the rights of other states.   Given these historical, empirical 
realities, asking states to be concerned with the rights of other states, and to allow for the 
interests of the least well-off states to be prioritized is, according to this objection, impractical.  
Thus, my proposal does not successfully merge a cosmopolitan and Rawlsian liberal account, 
because it fails to promote a realistic utopia. 
 The flaw in this objection is that it is unduly pessimistic about the trajectory of 
international relations.  As Louis Henkin observes, "almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."
6
 
International law is generally non-binding, with little to nothing in the way of enforcement 
mechanisms, yet the vast majority of states still adhere to it.  The majority of empirical work 
regarding international relations has confirmed this.
7
 Rogue states are few and far between, and 
even rogue states often cooperate on some international issues.
8
 Thus, "to deny that international 
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law exists as a system of binding legal rules flies in the face of all the evidence."
9
 Furthermore, 
this is not a new phenomenon: historically, allies in Europe would assist each other in times of 
war, even when doing so was not directly advantageous to the assisting country. 
 The fact that states generally adhere to international law is important in that it 
demonstrates that states are willing to act in ways that, while not directly benefiting them, 
nevertheless serve the justice of the international community.  The implementation objection 
rests on the premise that states’ self-interest dictates their external interest, and that, for wealthy 
states, the unjust distributions in the global basic structure are to their advantage.  However, in 
light of the empirical consensus that, in fact, states are not exclusively motivated to ruthlessly 
pursue self-interest at the expense of others, this premise, and the objection that stems from it, 
cannot be sustained. 
 Furthermore, the trajectory of the international community is increasingly towards 
recognizing and enforcing rights of people in all states, not merely within one’s own borders.  
Starting with the United Nations and the Nuremburg Trials that emerged from the desolation of 
World War Two, the international community has moved increasingly towards mutual 
cooperation and consensus on issues such as human rights and peace and security.  Since its 
inception, the United Nations has ratified hundreds of treaties, including fifty-three treaties in the 
twenty-first century alone.
10
 Many of these treaties have widespread acceptance and ratification.  
The Convention of the Rights of the Child, for instance, has one hundred and forty signatory 
states, including such disparate societies as Afghanistan, Kirgizstan, and Zimbabwe, as well as 
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wealthy states such as France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
11
 In 
other words, a broad and disparate group of states, including wealthy countries, has agreed to 
adhere to international principles of human rights, even though it results in a potential loss of 
sovereignty and does not have any immediate benefits for the state.  Thus, the notion that my 
proposal is not viable is not true insofar as the empirical premises it rests on are false.  The 
trajectory of international relations is increasingly towards stronger international institutions and 
interconnectedness, as demonstrated by the rise of the United Nations.   
 The European Union, NAFTA, OPEC, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
and the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) are all further demonstrations that the 
empirical basis for rejecting my proposal are not, on face, persuasive.  The rise of international 
cooperation has touched every corner of the globe and dramatically influenced and shaped state 
policy.  Insofar as the trajectory of international relations has been towards increased cooperation 
and agreement, even at the expense of direct self-interest, the policy I propose does not violate 
the criteria of a realistic utopia. 
 A second variation of the implementation objection is that the policy I have proposed is 
an imposition of western values that unduly prioritizes individual rights over group rights, 
thereby alienating non-western cultures.  Thus, non-western cultures would not benefit from the 
social contract because joining the international social contract would necessitate a loss of 
culture for them.   Thus, insofar as only Western states would agree to participate, the 
international social contract could never successfully and universally be implemented.   There 
are two responses to this objection.  First, the structure of the international social contract is 
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created by representatives of all states, not just Western states.  Second and most importantly, 
reasonable pluralism within the international contract promotes and preserves cultural diversity. 
 First, the international contract that I propose here is the agreement that would be reached 
by every state situated behind a veil of ignorance.  That is, the representative of a communitarian 
society like Japan would have no knowledge of the individualistic or communitarian aspects of 
their country, just as the representative of an individualistic society like the United States would 
be unaware of their individualistic tendencies.  Thus, the principles that would derive from this 
position would both preserve individual rights as well as allowing for group rights.  In this way, 
the communitarian concerns of non-Western societies would not be realized, because the 
structure that creates the principles already accounts for variations in perspective. 
 Second, reasonable pluralism is built into the structure of the international social contract.  
While human rights limitations prevent extremity in cultural difference—it would prevent, for 
example, a state from preventing women from accessing equivalent education as their male 
counterparts—pluralism preserves and protects variations in culture.  Furthermore, the 
conception of human rights is designed by the international original position to allow for 
pluralism, thus the institutions created represent a consensus by many cultures, not an imposition 
of European values.  While it is true that human rights limits pluralism’s bound, the 
representatives in the hypothetical original position would be unaware of the cultural norms, and 
thus the principles that would derive would be based on consensus and agreement, rather than 
alienation.  Thus, this second implementation concern is unjustified. 
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The Sustainability Objection  
 The second principle objection within the framework of political liberalism is the 
sustainability objection.  The sustainability objection posits that even if an international social 
contract were implemented, it would fall apart.  That is, even if implemented, it could not be 
maintained.  According to this objection, the principles I have proposed here are self 
contradictory insofar as the principles derived from the international social contract would 
necessitate open borders which would collapse the system of states this model requires into a 
world state.   
 Seyla Benhabib, a cosmopolitan, has argued that "the status of alienage ought not to 
denude one of fundamental rights."
12
 In other words, human rights ought not be premised upon 
the membership in one state or another.  Further, Benhabib contends that "to view political 
society as a 'complete and closed social system' is incompatible with other premises of Rawlsian 
liberalism."
13
 Instead, representatives of states would choose principles that allowed for freedom 
of movement across borders, so-called ‘open borders,’ because in an original position, 
representatives would seek to ensure maximum rights for their citizens, even if those maximum 
rights occurred in another state.  Thus, in the original position, representatives would pick a 
principle of open borders.  The result would be an international society of societies which are 
“overlapping, and fluid entities, whose boundaries are permeable and porous, [where] whole 
moral visions travel across borders, are assimilated into other contexts, are then reexported back 
into the home country, and so on.”14 Furthermore, in order to establish a principle of fair equality 
of opportunity, furthermore, open borders would be necessary. If my nationality limits my 
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options because better opportunities are available to citizens of another state, then fair equality of 
opportunity is violated. Thus, instead of a collection of states that come together to regulate the 
global basic structure, the principle of open borders that would be necessitated by the structure of 
the original position would create a free-flowing, shifting hodge-podge of communities and 
identities that would be completely unregulated by state borders.  States, thus, would be 
inefficient actors for regulating the basic structure of smaller areas, and a world state would be 
necessitated.  If a world state was necessitated, the convergence that I hold should occur between 
Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans would collapse, as Rawlsian liberals explicitly reject a 
world state, and the proposal I make would collapse.   
 The flaw in this objection is twofold: first, representatives of states would not choose a 
principle of open borders, and secondly, a principle of open borders, even if it were a necessity 
of the structure I create, would not cause the structures I endorse to crumble.   
 First, representatives would not choose a principle of open borders.  Representatives of 
states are concerned not only with the rights of their people, but also with the institutional 
legitimacy and strength of that state.  A principle of open borders uniquely challenges the 
institutional strength, and, indeed, existence, of the state.  The massive migrations that Benhabib 
envisions would decimate the population size, institutions, and economic abilities of the 
countries whose populations emigrated, while the cultural integrity, social and economic 
institutions, and governing capacities of the countries that received the immigrants would be 
compromised.  Thus, on an institutional level, representatives of states in the original position 
would be disincentivized from creating a principle of open borders, because doing so would 
actively destabilize political, economic, and social institutions of both countries involved.  
Immigration, then, is unlike other issues where one state stands to benefit from a policy while the 
Fetrow 87 
other stands to lose.  In the case of immigration, both types of states stand to lose on institutional 
ground. 
 The objector may still reply that human rights must trump these institutional concerns: if 
people stand to have a better life, they ought be allowed to emigrate as they see fit, regardless of 
the cost to institutions that such migrations might engender.  This response fails for two reasons.  
First, the principles of justice that derive from the convergence of cosmopolitan and Rawlsian 
liberal approaches that I describe in the previous chapter would ensure a different principle 
between states, which would serve to reduce inequalities and create opportunities and justice in 
all states.  Thus, any injustices that give rise to massive inequalities that would create the 
conditions for massive migrations would not be created under the principles of justice I propose.  
In other words, if the difference principle is satisfied, there will not be any demand for massive 
migrations. A need for open borders is evidence of an unjust global order, and cannot rightfully 
be applied to the principles of global justice I have argue for here. Furthermore, the injustices 
and suffering caused by the collapse of states as a result of massive migrations would exacerbate, 
rather than solve the human rights harms in the status quo.  Thus, even if human rights abuses are 
not solved in the short term, the proposal of open borders, far from alleviating these concerns, 
would exacerbate them. 
 There is another option for what would happen if my proposal and open borders were 
simultaneously implanted. It is, I think, a more realistic possibility, though still insufficient to 
require open borders. In a world in which the principles of justice I argue for were applied, there 
would be relative justice across the globe. There would be no need for massive migrations, 
because such migrations are generally the results of vast and unjust economic inequalities (such 
as the case of the United States and Mexico), or other social and political disturbances, such as 
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war, which is itself often the result of an unjust basic structure. In a world regulated by these 
principles here, these phenomena would, theoretically, not occur. Moreover, in cases of famine, 
drought, or other natural disasters, duties of assistance, part of the difference principle, would 
prevent the need for massive relocations until such time as the disaster had passed. Thus, the 
impetus for migration across open borders would be based on family location, job opportunities, 
or other personal reasons. The justice-based reasons for allowing open borders seem not to apply 
in this case: the right is not to have equal opportunity in every country; rather, it is to have justice 
in your country.  Other considerations, then, may apply. In this case, reasonable pluralism is 
appropriately allowable. A state’s desire to maintain its culture, history, and traditions can take 
precedent here, because rights are not being violated. Therefore, because open borders are not 
justified on a human rights ground, reasonable pluralism allows that states be able to choose who 
and how many immigrants they are willing to accept.  
 The second objection that rises from the sustainability objection is that the international 
institutions that would be necessary to enforce the principles that derive from the international 
social contract would be so onerous that they would collapse, either due to corruption, disparate 
power allocation, or a variety of other factors.  The institutions would be simply too large, to 
complex, and would collapse.  The flaw in this second objection, however, is that it is not a 
necessary condition of the model I have proposed.  It is, in short, an empirical, rather than 
theoretical question.  Moreover, empirically, international institutions do exist and have not 
collapsed under their own weight.  The sustainability objection, thus, is no more compelling in 
this formulation than it is in regards to immigration. 
 Within a liberal, realist framework, neither of the questions that arise are, ultimately, 
compelling reasons to disavow the argument that I make here.  Thus, within the context of 
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Rawlsian liberalism, my proposal stands.  Other objections from beyond the liberal camp, such 
as objections from utilitarians such as Peter Singer might provide compelling counterarguments 
to my arguments here.  However, in the scope of my project, I set these objections aside, and 
argue that within the context of Rawlsian social contract theory, my proposal holds. 
 
The Interconnectivity Objection 
 The second branch of objection within the Rawlsian liberal framework is that the global 
basic structure is not analogous to the domestic basic structure. If the global basic structure does 
not have an impact on the chances, potential outcomes, and options available to people living 
across the world, then my argument cannot hold. The tension that exists within Rawls’s 
conception of justice in the domestic and international case is predicated on the idea that he is 
treating like kinds in unlike ways. That is, because the global basic structure has an equivalent 
impact on peoples’ lives as the domestic basic structure, the institutions and norms that regulate 
them must be similar in kind. This idea underlies my argument that Rawlsian liberal and 
cosmopolitan approaches to global justice would converge. If the global basic structure is, in 
fact, not as deeply pervasive as I hold, then my argument cannot stand. 
 It is beyond doubt that the world is deeply and increasingly interconnected. However, the 
extent to which this is true may be disputed. The scope of the global basic structure is 
fundamentally an empirical question. The interconnectivity objection holds, thus, that while an 
increase in international law or other explicitly international institutions or norms may be 
occurring, domestic structures still have purely domestic implications. Thus, states cannot be 
held responsible to others for their actions, because the ramifications of domestic policies are 
entirely domestic. 
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 However, this argument is empirically falsified. Both in a variety of academic literature 
as well as public discourse accept the existence and pervasive nature of the global basic structure 
as a given. Discussions of globalization, transnational identities, and international movements all 
accept and provide support for claims of global interconnectivity and the existences of a global 
basic structure. I provide examples from a variety of academic fields and geographic regions 
here to further demonstrate that the global basic structure does exist in the pervasive and 
widespread form that I advocate in chapter three. 
One clear example of the interconnected nature of the world is the relationship between 
domestic agricultural policy and international welfare. As far back as 1992, Giovanni Anania, 
Mary Bohman and Colin A. Carter have argued that wheat subsidies in the United States, which 
were established in order to help American farmers, have had effects not only on American 
wheat prices and production, but on global welfare.
15
  Similarly, the United States maintains 
heavy subsidies for other crops, like cotton, which cover as much as 80% of the cost of cotton 
production.
16
 Unlike the United States, however, “developing countries cannot afford to 
subsidies their farmers as generously.”17 Therefore, farmers in these developing countries cannot 
afford to compete with their American counterparts, because of the institutional and structural 
advantage of American cotton growers. This means that cotton farmers in areas like Western 
Africa are unable to use cotton to create profits that would allow them to better their welfare and 
improve their own basic structure. Moreover, this institutional advantage for American cotton 
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 Anania, Giovanni; Bohman, Mary; Carter, Colin A. 1992. “United States Export Subsidies in Wheat: 
Strategic Trade Policy or Expensive Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Tactic?” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. Vol. 74, No. 3 (Aug., 1992). 534-545 
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and What Next?” The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 44, No. 2. 251-274: 252 
17 
Ibid. 
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producers exists even in spite of dramatically lower cost of living and production costs in 
countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Malawi, and Benin.
18
  
The flip side of this is also true. In Bolivia, for instance, quinoa has been a staple grain 
for millennia. However, as Bolivia has expanded its trade connections, quinoa has grown popular 
in western liberal democracies.
19
 This has caused quinoa prices to skyrocket in Bolivia, meaning 
that those that have traditionally been able to afford quinoa can no longer afford to do so, and 
instead are forced to purchase less expensive staple foods like wheat or corn—often produced in 
the United States by the same subsidies that reduce welfare in Western Africa.
20
 Agriculture, 
thus, is one area where it is clear that the interconnected nature of the world means that domestic 
basic structures are not separate. However, agriculture is not the only economic area that 
demonstrates the existence of the global basic structure. The disparity in wealth between the 
global rich and the global poor is deeply created, sustained, and exacerbated by the global basic 
structure.
21
 This interconnectivity necessitates consideration of the global basic structure in 
determining principles of global justice, particularly in regards to economic distribution.    
Another area where it is clear that the world’s interconnectivity has serious and lasting 
effects is law. International law is increasingly defined and understood, in part because of the 
connectivity of other aspects of the basic structure. As one legal scholar argues, “law is heavily 
implicated in the process of globalization.”22 An ever-growing list of treaties, international 
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bodies, trade-agreements, international justice systems, and international copyright law restrict 
the possibilities of countries, corporations, organizations, and individuals.
23
 These international 
institutions, structures, and agreements are perhaps the clearest examples of the existence of the 
global basic structure. They demonstrate that a series of explicit regulations and institutions both 
construct and regulate at least to some extent a basic structure that affects individuals and states.  
Domestic political decisions are likewise affected by the global basic structure.  Theories 
of international movements present compelling arguments for the global basic structure. Many 
social movement theorists, for example, contend that by reaching out to advocates in other states, 
advocacy can create a ‘boomerang’ effect which amplifies their voice and power in achieving 
their policy aims. This creates pressure on international bodies, through which groups can 
influence national governments through the pressure imposed by the institutions of the global 
basic structure.
24
  If activists can harness the power of the global basic structure, it must, by 
necessity, both exist, and be powerful enough to influence individual states. 
 Other aspects of culture are similarly formed by and limited by the global basic structure. 
Modern technology has rendered light-speed transmission of information, art, ideas, news, and 
other media to distant corners of the planet mundane. No sooner than an event happens than it is 
filmed, photographed, uploaded, and shared with followers around the world. Ideas bounce from 
China to South Africa to Argentina to Poland in a blink. Culture—food, music, dance, fashion, 
and a myriad of other norms—has never been so international, nor so formed, unchecked, by the 
international community. Culture, thus, like economic, politics, or law, is deeply and pervasively 
influenced by the existence and strength of the global basic structure.  
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This discussion of instances of the global basic structure is far from exhaustive. What it 
does serve to demonstrate, however, is that the global basics structure (1) exists, (2) is pervasive, 
and (3) seriously impacts individuals’ and states’ opportunities and outcomes, just as the basic 
structure in a domestic society does. Thus, the tension that I indentify between Rawls’s domestic 
and international cases stands, and my argument likewise stands. Like the implementation and 
sustainability objections, then, the interconnectivity objection is ultimately not compelling.  
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks  
 
 
 Global justice has long been a concern of philosophers and policy makers alike.  Creating 
and promoting institutions and norms that enhance global justice is the center of heated debate 
on which the welfare and even lives of billions of people hang.  Though the discussion of justice 
that I provide here is by no means complete, my results have implications for philosophical 
consideration of the issue as well as political and legal considerations.   
First, my results have implications for theorists of global justice.  Rawlsian liberals must 
consider more seriously the implications of the reality of a global basic structure for their theory.  
If the argument that I make here holds, the existence and pervasiveness of the global basic 
structure render the differences in Rawls’s account of domestic versus international justice 
unsustainable and problematic.  Recognizing the existence of the global basic structure requires a 
serious reevaluation of the Rawlsian liberal framework for international justice.  Moreover, it 
means that the egalitarian principles of justice that Rawls advocates ought be applied in the 
international case in addition to the domestic case.  Furthermore, accepting the empirical truth of 
the global basic structure has implications for the structure of the global social contract insofar as 
Rawlsian liberalism seeks to promote a realistic utopia.  Recognition of the global basic structure 
necessitates the use of states as actors, as well as broad principles of inclusion and membership.  
These reevaluations of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples and its successors ultimately require that 
Rawlsian liberalism converge on cosmopolitanism. 
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Additionally, the global basic structure means that Rawlsian rejection of libertarian 
entitlement theory as an adequate mechanism to ensure social justice on the international level.  
Rawls’s attempt to distinguish the domestic case from the international case rests on the idea that 
there are background conditions that meaningfully shape and limit one’s choices and options 
only in the domestic case.  Put another way, a basic structure only exists at the domestic level, 
not the international one.  However, as I have demonstrated, this is empirically and demonstrably 
incorrect.  Because the global basic structure has just as much, perhaps even more, impact on the 
scope of available choices, the arguments that seek to distinguish the domestic from the 
international case crumble.  Rawls’s critique of libertarianism is thus equally compelling at the 
international level as it is on the domestic one.  Because libertarianism ignores the basic 
structure, it falsely assumes that our actions are fully our own, and our successes and failures are 
ours to celebrate or bear equally alone.  However, given the global basic structure, external 
factors affect our outcomes, and thus regulation of the basic structure is necessary to ensure 
justice. 
Furthermore, my results have implications for cosmopolitans, as well.  Recognizing the 
existence and influence of the global basic structure supports my claim that cosmopolitans 
should recognize the value of states and use them as the primary actor in an international social 
contract, despite cosmopolitans’ ultimate concern for the individual, because of the pragmatic 
benefits to individual welfare that derive from states as actors.  Furthermore, it emphasizes 
institutional cosmopolitanism, rather than interactional cosmopolitanism.  This means that 
cosmopolitans ought be concerned with structures and institutions rather than individual actions.  
These considerations drive cosmopolitanism further towards Rawlsian liberalism into a 
convergence of the two theoretical branches.   
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Discussion of the nature, scope, and basis for global justice is important on a pragmatic 
as well as philosophical level.  Questions of global justice occur not only in academia, but in 
governance and legal circles as well.  Global justice is the center of debates around many topics, 
including the environment, intellectual property, war, and human rights.   My project here has 
not proposed on advocated for particular policies, mechanisms for implementation, or guidelines 
for enforcement.  Further work must be done to determine how the theoretical framework I 
propose here might be implemented into specific policies that most effectively promote global 
justice.  My suggestion that the global basic structure is pluralistic provides a useful mechanism 
for beginning to think about how issues like the environment, war, intellectual property, or 
immigration might be addressed.  Put another way, when we think about the global basic 
structure as multifaceted, solutions to different problems may have different institutional 
solutions.  The global basic structure is complex, and the system that addresses it might be 
equivalently complex.  Determining how this complex structure would be organized requires 
further investigation and analysis. 
Although here I focus primarily on urgent issues like poverty and welfare, the 
implications of my argument go far beyond that.  A useful next step in the debate over how best 
to create a just global basic structure would be to consider issues such as regulation of 
multinational corporations, green cards and work visas, and trade.
1
  The global basic structure 
has serious implications for these issues as well as for the welfare concerns that I primarily 
discuss here.   
Furthermore, the analysis here does not discuss at length what the content of a doctrine of 
human rights would entail beyond the scope of welfare rights.  The principles and guidelines that 
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 See James, Aaron. 2012. Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy (Oxford 
Political Philosophy). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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I established in chapter four law foundations for this exploration, but further work must be done 
to fully conceptualize what a doctrine of human rights would entail on my account of global 
justice. 
By coming to terms with the reality of our increasingly interconnected world, theories of 
global justice are able to better able to provide accounts for a realistic utopia.  It requires 
Rawlsian liberals and cosmopolitans to converge on an account of justice that advocates 
egalitarian principles and human rights.  Further discussion might focus on the implications of 
these principles for other aspects of the global basic structure, or explore what policies and 
institutions might best promote the principles that I advance here.  In our interconnected and 
interdependent world, answering the question of how to promote global justice has never been so 
urgent.   
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